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Abstract 
Jongeneel, R.A. & L. Ge, 2010. Farmers’ behavior and the provision of public goods: Towards an analytical 
framework. . Wageningen, Statutory Research Tasks Unit for Nature & the Environment (WOT Natuur & Milieu), WOt-
werkdocument 203. 64 p;.6 Figs.; 9 Tabs.; 58 Refs.; 1 Appendix.  
 
The new CAP reform aims to stimulate the role of agriculture as provider of public goods. An analytical framework 
is developed to model farmers’ decision making and to gain insight into farmers’ behavior in response to a number 
of policy instruments. The framework integrates characteristics of farm, farmer, market, as well as the policy 
instruments. Theoretical analysis suggests that attitudes, off-farm employment opportunities, non-pecuniary 
benefits and expectations of future developments can play important roles in farmer’s decision making regarding 
the provision of public goods. Empirical research is needed to test the hypothesis. 
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Summary 
This study tries to improve the insight into the decision for participation in multifunctional 
agricultural activities (e.g. biodiversity and landscape preservation schemes, etc.). Often these 
activities have an externality or public good character, which implies that the market will fail to 
ensure an efficient allocation. In order to achieve an adequate provision of these 
multifunctional outputs and/or ‘public goods’ an active involvement of the policy maker is 
required. The study starts with having a look at the peculiarities of this public good-
management task. Also the interaction of such a public good policy with a country’s other 
policies, notably its trade policy, is considered. It is argued that in general compensatory 
payments or financial penalties are the appropriate way to stimulate optimal public good 
provision (or reduction of public bads). It is concluded, that in general, this provides no 
justification for (protective) trade policies. However, the public goods issue needs proper 
treatment in the WTO trade negotiation framework: countries should have autonomy in the way 
they use taxes and subsidies, at least as far as these payments are properly targeted and the 
implied compensations (or punishments) are proportional with the efforts (or harm) made. 
 
Significant attention is paid to concepts and production technology. With respect to the latter 
in particular the degree of jointness appeared to be crucial. Private and public outputs can be 
complementary, independent or competing. Moreover, the trade-off between private and 
public outputs is most likely to be non-constant, but changing with changing private output 
levels. This may even lead to complementarity-competing-switches. As a general point, the 
results emphasize the need to carefully analyze how the public outputs are produced and their 
way of interaction with the private output. There is also a link from this to the determination of 
a proper remuneration of public good provision activities.  
 
As regards the behavior of farmers, in contrast with many other studies, this study takes into 
account the role that farmers’ attitudes, intrinsic motivations and moral convictions might play. 
Therewith also the potential impact of these factors on the participation decision can be 
analyzed. From the solution of the farmer’s utility maximization problem, and some further 
comparative statics analysis, the role of these and other factors has been clarified. Moreover, 
the specific issues involved in case of multi-annual contracts are separately discussed. This 
made clear the crucial role of expectations, uncertainty and ‘irreversibility’ on the participation 
decision. Also insight is gained in what factors might lead to postponement of participation 
decisions. This could have been further extended to lock in-effects and compliance issues. 
 
The study has a strong analytical focus. As such it does not yet provide insight into the 
empirical importance of the various issues, and an empirical follow-up is recommended to 
create a more complete picture. However, this study provides valuable input about how to 
properly model public good activities. This is in particular useful, since the models used for 
policy analysis in this realm are still in need of further improvement, in particular with respect 
to the public good outputs. As the analysis shows, not only the regular variables explaining 
economic supply activities (such as output and input prices) are important, but also the 
contract specification is crucial, since it is this that determines the opportunity costs of 
participation. It was argued that this relationship is complex. However, given that the basic 
mechanism is understood, the framework provides in this study might also be a guide to more 
simplified (or reduced form) approaches. 
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1 Introduction and context  
1.1 Aim of the research 
This WOT research project aims to contribute to the project ‘Herziening Gemeenschappelijk 
Landbouwbeleid’ of the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL), which has as its 
main task to advise the government on environmental policy issues. In the debate about future 
CAP reform and future budget allocation to agriculture the role of agriculture as a provider of 
public goods and services has become increasingly important. This report adds to that debate 
in three ways: 
1. It analyses a number of contextual issues in this debate. These include the role of 
governance aspects and the linkage of public goods and trade issues; 
2. It clarifies a number of concepts (such as public good, externality, jointness, etc.) based 
on a survey of the literature and studies the implications they have for the policy context; 
3. It focuses on the behavior of farmers under different policy-incentive schemes and tries to 
explicitize things like opportunity costs of policy restrictions, the participation decision, 
and provides an analytical framework to better understand the explanatory factors and 
impacts. 
 
Whereas the main aim of this study is step 3, the authors considered it crucial to also go 
through steps 1 and 2, although in a less detailed way. The main reason is that a good analysis 
of step 3 requires insight into the policy context and issues (for example knowledge about the 
type of policy instruments that might be used and thus have to be considered in step 3). 
 
As indicated the main emphasis will be on step 3. First a formal approach will be followed. It 
has the advantage that one can focus on key issues and abstract from a lot of practical 
details, which always are there, but often are not decisive for analyzing the basic mechanisms. 
Moreover, it opens up the possibility to link the analysis with the theoretical economic 
literature and therewith ensure a kind of soundness of results and implications. The approach 
has as a disadvantage that highly abstract results might be obtained, which have no direct 
translation into the day to day practical policy realm. For that reason the translation of the 
obtained theoretical insights for the policy sphere is an explicit aim of this study. Readers 
interested in the practical lessons might skip the theoretical parts (e.g. skip Chapter 5, but 
directly go to Chapter 6). 
 
 
1.2 Aspects and issues 
Public good policy concerns a wide range of issues and can be approached from different 
angles. Figure 1 provides a scheme distinguishing supply, demand and organizational aspects 
of public goods concerning farmers as a supplier of public goods.  
 
From an organizational perspective, demand and supply of public goods can be arranged 
through three types of institutions: market, government and clubs. Market produces public 
goods as externalities to its transactions of private goods. Since externalities are not taken 
into account in the decision making of individual market agents, supply of public goods 
through markets often fails to reach socially optimal outcome. Government and clubs, 
representing collective interests, can achieve socially optimal outcome by internalizing the 
externalities. The role of government is particularly important in public good provision as in 
principle goods concern the society as a whole. 
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Figure 1: Overview of research related to the provision of public goods by agriculture 
 
As regards the supply side, a crucial issue is the farmer’s behavior in allocating natural and 
human resources to the production of marketed goods and public goods. How is the farmer, 
being a controller of resources and supplier of private goods, going to respond to different 
policies or policy instruments (regulations, contracts, subsidies, etc.) aiming to stimulate the 
provision of public goods? In particular, when participation in public good provision schemes is 
voluntary, insight into the likely level of participation and the factors explaining a certain 
degree of participation is crucial. Also the role and degree of connectedness between private 
good and public good provision is likely to be important to assess final policy outcomes. There 
exists extensive literature on policy instruments and farmer’s behavior but it needs further 
tailoring to the current issue (agriculture as a specific sector, providing specific public goods). 
 
The demand side of public goods concerns the society’s preferences and willingness to pay 
for public goods. Stated preferences methods such as contingent valuation methods and 
choice experiments are often used to assess the benefit of the public goods to the ‘public’ 
(e.g., Brower 2008). Occasionally, revealed preferences are also used by checking the voting 
behavior (e.g., Schram and Van Winden 1989). In this study the valuation and demand issue 
will not be dealt with in any detail. 
 
In general, direct demand for public goods and other organizational forms of public goods 
provision are all relevant. The institutional framework of public good provision has received 
considerable attention in literature (see e.g., Hodge 2001). This research focuses on the 
behavior of farmers and looks into the incentives and constraints generated by policy 
instruments and their potential impact on farmer’s behavior. However, this cannot be done in 
isolation from how demand will be organized and implemented by means of different policy 
arrangements. For example, it makes a difference when farmers face incentive contracts, get 
remunerated based on performance or direct regulation will be enforced on them. Moreover, 
contracts can differ in flexibility and extension (individual, group, regional contracts, etc.). In 
this study the policy context and institutional or organizational issues will be reflected upon, 
because an assessment of this is a prerequisite to select a stylized set of typical and likely 
policy arrangements on the one hand, and also to get insight into the set of (affected) 
variables that is relevant to consider in the analysis (e.g. profits, participation, costs, etc.) on 
the other hand. 
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1.3 CAP reform and Dutch policy proposition on the 
provision of public goods 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is one of the corner stones of the EU integration 
process. The CAP was originally developed in the late 1950s and 1960s, mainly in the form of 
market and price (support) policy (Pillar I). Since the beginning of the 1990’s, the CAP has 
gradually evolved into a direct income payment systems with an additional rural development 
component (Pillar II). Important steps in this process are: the MacSharry reform in 1992, 
Agenda 2000 in 1999, the Midterm Review in 2003 and the Health Check in 2008 (see for 
example Keyzer et al, 2003). Moreover, first decisions on the financing of the EU including the 
CAP beyond 2013 will be taken in the Announcement of the Commission that is scheduled for 
November 2010.  
 
The MacSharry reform involves an important change of direction for the CAP. The essential 
change is the increasing substitution of price support by direct payments to farmers. In the 
2003 Midterm Review it was decided to over time fully decouple most direct payments (single 
farm payment scheme, SPS) from production. At the same time receipt of payments was 
made conditional on the eligible farmers satisfying certain minimum requirements with respect 
to biodiversity, environment, health, animal welfare and sustainable land use practices 
(obligatory cross-compliance). The recent Health Check further extended the decoupling to 
include all direct payments and simplified the cross-compliance policy, without affecting its 
substance. 
 
Driving forces behind the CAP reforms were: the huge intervention stocks, international 
conflicts and rapid increasing budget expenditures in the 1970s and 1980s; the GATT-WTO 
negotiations in the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) and to a lesser extent the still inconclusive 
Doha Development Agenda Round (2001-?); the changing desires and needs of the European 
citizens; the changing position of agriculture in the rural economy; the changing role of 
governments in the European society; and the enlargement of the EU (Keyzer et al, 2003). 
 
New developments in CAP since the Health Check emphasize the role of agriculture as a 
‘provider of public goods’, ‘an energy provider’, ‘a climate changes mitigator’. In summary, 
public support to agriculture is increasingly justified due to the public service generated by 
agriculture which is unpaid in the market. The old justification of the CAP as an instrument to 
enhance productivity and income support is of declining significance. 
 
 
1.4 Dutch vision of the future of CAP, policy objectives and 
policy instruments 
The Dutch vision on the CAP (De Houtskoolschets) advocates a transition from the current 
direct income payments scheme to a targeted bonus reward system from 2014 onwards. The 
proposed new system aims at stimulating the provision of public goods such as landscape, 
soil quality, conservation of biodiversity. The Netherlands Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and 
Food Quality (LNV) has proposed in its strategic vision a further targeted policy which 
stimulates the provision of public goods (LNV 2008), therewith following the advice from The 
Dutch Council for the Rural Areas (RLG 2007) and The Social and Economic Council of the 
Netherlands (SER 2008). 
 
Dutch agriculture faces unmistakable threats: environmental degradation, climate change, 
withering nature reserves, and the urban pressure on the quality of life on the countryside. 
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Agricultural entrepreneurs must respond to this changing social-economic environment. There 
is challenge for both policy maker and agricultural producers to counteract the threats, profit 
from the opportunities, and in realizing these objectives, effectively and efficiently make use of 
European funds. 
 
The overall policy goal in the Netherlands with regard to agriculture is to stimulate the welfare 
enhancing role of agriculture within the framework of the CAP. In particular, the objectives are 
food security and safety, competitiveness of Dutch agriculture, minimal generation of negative 
externalities, minimal distortion of the market and optimal provision of public goods given a 
pre-specified budget constraint. 
 
The advisory council SER recommended a 4-group model, as shown in Table 1, as a tool to 
guide the applicability of policy instruments in terms of income support or public goods 
provision. According to their philosophy in case there are no physical (e.g. mountainous area) 
or institutional handicaps (e.g. Natura 2000 zone) and farms don’t contribute to the provision 
of public goods, no income support is necessary. To the extent there are such handicaps 
compensations might be justified. Moreover, innovation policy can still be implemented for this 
group (e.g. Group 1). The existence of handicaps presents an argument for income support, 
whereas the provision of public goods presents an argument for targeted policies facilitating 
their supply. The reference to cross-compliance makes sure that minimum standards with 
respect to food safety, biodiversity, environment, animal welfare, health, etc. are satisfied. 
Although the SER is not very precise on this it would be logical to impose the cross-
compliance conditionality to all payments farmers (for whatever reasons) receive from the 
government (e.g. also add this condition to Group 4).  
 
As Table 1 further suggests public goods provision is relying on voluntary participation, not on 
regulation. (In reality certain public goods might be directly linked to certain farming systems, 
being natural byproducts of certain farming practices, or jointly produced with private 
outputs). Voluntary provision of public goods presupposes the availability of a set of contracts 
(specifying both requirements and compensation) farmers can freely choose of. The SER 
largely follows the existing trend in CAP reforms, with as a main exception that it limits income 
support to special cases, whereas the Commission still acknowledges a more general need 
for income support of agriculture. 
 
Table 1: Groups of Agricultural Producers and Corresponding Instruments (SER 2008) 
Production  Without Handicap With Handicap 
Regular production 
 + no public goods 
Group 1 
- No income support 
- Innovation policy 
Group 2 
- Income support 
Cross compliance 
Regular production 
 + Public Goods 
Group 3 
- No income support 
- Voluntary provision of public 
goods 
 
Group 4 
- Income support 
- Cross compliance 
Voluntary provision of public 
goods 
 
 
1.5 Farmer’s behavior with respect to the new CAP  
Implementing the new CAP raises many theoretical and practical questions. For example, is 
the coupling of CAP funds with public good provision justified? While public good provision is 
often used as an argument for compensating farmers, some critics consider the payment as 
hidden government subsidy which will have distortive effect on agricultural production and 
trade (Potter and Tilzey 2007). Further more, if the policy aims to stimulate public good 
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provision, which instruments can better realize the goal of the policy? Should a uniformed 
payment scheme be preferred to a differentiated scheme? The most relevant ones, however, 
concern the farmers’ response to the instruments. Information about this is crucial, for 
example to assess whether the policies will be sufficient to achieve the policy objectives. How 
will different policy instruments influence farmers’ decision making? What factors are expected 
to influence farmers’ acceptance of policy instruments? How can policy design take into 
account of these factors?  
 
In order to gain insight into farmers’ decision making, an analytical framework is developed in 
this research. In particular, the framework addresses following questions: 
• What are the theoretical issues relevant to the design of public good policy? 
• Why should provision of public goods such as green and blue services be stimulated and 
rewarded? 
• Which insight can theory provide in farmer’s behavior in response to policy instruments? 
• What impacts might result from transforming the single farm payment scheme into a new 
system of payments (e.g. flat rate) or re-targeted payments? 
• What incentives and constraints do the policy instruments impose on the farmers?  
• What are the factors that determine the participating behavior of farmers? 
• How can these insights be translated to practical lessons? 
 
 
1.6 Reading guide  
Before presenting the theoretical background of public good policy in Chapter 3, Chapter 2 
introduces a number of important concepts and definitions related to the policy debate. A 
formal analysis on farmer’s behavior in response to four different policy instruments will be 
illustrated in Chapter 4. The analysis provided in Chapter 4 is mainly static. Chapter 5 relies on 
a multiperiod analysis in order to illustrate the intertemporal aspects, for example such as 
those associated with multi-annual contracts. As such this chapter should improve the insight 
in the potential role of option values in the farmer’s participation decision. Practical 
implications for policy design and evaluation are presented in Chapter 6. 
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2 Concepts, definitions, and theoretical issues 
Agricultural policy, especially the CAP, concerns a number of prominent but elusive concepts 
such as public goods, externality, jointness, multifunctionality, and coupling. The elusiveness 
of these concepts can lead to confusion in political or academic debates. It is therefore 
important to give clear definition of these concepts for the analysis.  
 
 
2.1 Public goods  
The provision of public goods has been an important issue in the discussion about public 
policy and public expenditure. In economic theory, public goods refer to goods or bads that 
possess the property of nonrivalry and nonexcludability (see e.g., Samuelson 1954). Non-
rivalry means that the good, once produced, can be consumed by an additional consumer at 
no additional cost. One person’s enjoyment of the benefit of a public good does not interfere 
with another’s consumption of it. Non-excludability refers to the property that consumers 
cannot be excluded from consuming the public good once it is produced. Typical examples 
mentioned in standard textbooks of economics are national defense, clean air, and general 
infrastructure. 
 
Real-world goods are seldom strictly non-excludable and nonrivalry. The ‘public-ness’ of a good 
has often a temporal or spatial dimension which makes almost all goods impure in the strict 
sense. The notion of ‘local’ public goods, partially excludable public goods etc. refer to various 
kinds of impure public goods. A classification of public goods according to different degrees 
of excludability and rivalry is shown in Table 2, based on OECD (2001).  
 
Whether a good or service is excludable can change due to technological developments. For 
example, encryption allows broadcasters to sell individual access to their programming, while 
it was not possible before to exclude everyone with a receiver from receiving the radio signal. 
It should be emphasized that the property of being ‘public goods’ is not inherent to a good or 
a service, but rather determined by the incentive structures provided for the production 
and/or consumption (Cornes and Sandler 1996).  
 
Table 2: Classification of Private and Public Goods  
Rivalry  
Non-rival Congestible Rival 
Non-
excludable 
Pure public goods 
 
e.g.  
National defense 
 
Type II:  
 
e.g.  
Open access 
resources, lake, forest 
Type II:  
 
e.g. 
Open access  
resources 
Partially  Type I:  
 
e.g. 
Local pure  
public goods 
Type III:  
 
e.g. 
Common property 
resources 
Type III:  
 
e.g. 
Common property 
resources 
Ex
cl
ud
ab
ili
ty
 
Excludable Type IV:  
 
e.g. 
Toll road without 
congestion 
Type V:  
 
e.g. 
Club goods 
Private goods 
 
e.g. 
A loaf of bread 
Source (OECD 2001, p77) 
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2.2 Externalities  
In economic theory, externality refers in general to the impact of an economic transaction on a 
party (parties) that is (are) not directly involved in the transaction. More formally, Baumol and 
Oates (1988, 17-18) link externalities with two conditions: 
1)  An externality is present whenever some individual’s utility or production relationships 
include real (i.e. non-monetary) variables whose values are chosen by others (persons, 
corporations, governments) without particular attention to the effect on the welfare of the 
individuals receiving the externality; 
2)  The decision maker, whose activity affects others’ utility levels or enters their production 
functions, does not receive (pay) in compensation for this activity an amount equal to the 
resulting benefits (or costs) to others. 
 
They consider an externality to be present if condition 1) is satisfied. The second proviso is 
required if the externality is to have all of the (un)pleasant consequences (inefficiency, 
resource misallocation) that are associated with the concept. For this latter reason the 
phenomenon is sometimes stated to be a Pareto-relevant externality (i.e. an externality that 
prevents the necessary conditions for Pareto-optimality to be satisfied).  
 
Extensive theoretical treatment of externality can be found in environmental economics where 
the externality problem belongs to a class of ‘no technical solution problems’ that require 
proper social arrangements. In one way or another, all environmental and natural resource 
problems associated with overexploitation or under provision of public goods, arise from 
incompletely defined and enforced property rights (Libecap 2009). Arrow (1971) associates 
externalities with the absence of some markets for the trading of items affecting the welfare 
of economic agents. Many externalities partake of the character of public goods (Bator 1958). 
The nonrivalry property of public goods can exist because the quantity of the goods is too 
high to be depleted. As a further distinction Baumol and Oates (1988) mention a subclass of 
undepletable and depletable externalities, depending on whether their form or impacts are 
public (polluted air, water or noise) or rather have a more private character (dumping waste on 
property)1. 
 
In a classic paper Viner (1931) made a distinction into technological and pecuniary 
externalities. In the latter case one individual’s activity level will affect the financial 
circumstances of another’s, but need not produce a misallocation of resources in a world of 
pure competition. Pecuniary externalities result from the changes in prices of some inputs or 
outputs in the economy, while the underlying technology remains unchanged. Unlike pecuniary 
externalities, a technological externality involves a shift in the transformation functions relating 
quantities of resources as independent variables and output quantities or utility levels of 
consumers as dependent variables. Pecuniary externalities are irrelevant for the optimality of 
the market equilibrium (they don’t introduce divergences between private and social marginal 
rates of substitution and transformation). Technological externalities have policy relevance as 
they do cause the divergence between private and social marginal rates of substitution and 
transformation.  
 
 
                                                   
1  A public good or externality in principle is a commodity that is not depletable (which is similar to non-
rivalrous): the use of a unit of the good by one agent does not preclude its use by other agents. 
Occasionally an externality might, however, have a depletable character in that third parties might 
have some control over the amount of the externality they receive (be it not without a cost). An 
example could be that a certain trash externality is generated, where an individual receiving this 
externality might have some power to pass it on to others. Another example could be acid rain. 
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Agricultural production generates many externalities. Positive externalities such as wildlife and 
landscape increase the social value of agriculture, while negative externalities such as 
environmental degradation have led to increasing social pressure on agricultural production. In 
justifying public expenditure on externalities, positive externalities are often used 
interchangeably with public goods (and conversely, negative externalities with public bads). 
However, positive externalities and public goods, although closely related, are conceptually 
distinct from each other and have different policy implications. In particular, the number of 
recipients of the externalities is a crucial factor for policy intervention as they can significantly 
influence social welfare. To derive policy implications for the provision of public goods, it is 
necessary to elaborate on the link and distinction of these two concepts (Figure 2).  
Figure 2: Classification of externalities 
 
 
2.3 Interconnectedness of production 
Depending on the underlying technology, private and public goods outputs may be 
interconnected in various ways (see Appendix 1). Public goods are interconnected with 
agriculture through the use of inputs, the production methods, or qualities concerning the 
private goods produced by agriculture. In general, interconnectedness between public good 
production and private good production using the same set of inputs might show competition 
or complementarity in their production possibility sets through different forms of jointness in 
the production technology. Jointness in production of agricultural commodity and public goods 
such as landscape and biodiversity is the widely used argument to provide public support to 
farmers, as the production of public goods is not paid by the market. More specifically, for 
this case sometimes the argument is made that the public support can be granted in terms of 
classical price support to the commodity outputs. To the extent this reasoning is valid it raises 
an argument to justify the traditional way of support to agriculture. As will turn out below, this 
claim is contestable (see Section 2.4 below for a more detailed discussion). 
 
2.3.1 Jointness 
Externalities are often caused by jointness in production, which means multiple products are 
produced simultaneously but not all of them are simultaneously demanded. It implies also that 
when these multiple outputs are produced, inputs cannot be assigned specifically to each 
output. Or formulated in terms of the production function: it includes all outputs as a function 
of the inputs (Vatn, 2002, P313). In general there are three sources of jointness: 1) jointness 
due to technical interdependency; 2) jointness in non-allocable inputs (i.e., multiple outputs are 
obtained from one and the same input, e.g., grassland and meadow); 3) jointness in allocable 
fixed inputs (e.g., land and labor are typically fixed for one farm but can be allocated to 
different activities). Overall jointness is a combination of different sources.  
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The academic attention on jointness of production (joint multi-output production) dates back to 
the paper by Lau (1972). Traditionally jointness was seen as the primary reason for the 
existence of the multiproduct firm due to non-allocable inputs (Carlson 1939 (Reprinted 
1969)). Carlson noted that, when there is more than one variable input, we must ‘go to the 
relationship between costs and output’. A paper by Shumway, Pope and Nash (SPN, 1984) led 
to the debate on the existence and causes of jointness in agricultural production. According to 
these authors, many instances of multi-output production in agriculture are caused by 
allocable fixed inputs. This statement was questioned by Lynne (1988), who distinguished 
‘jointness in supply’ due to a resource or capital constraint (processes connected behaviorally) 
and ‘jointness in technology’ due to technical interdependence. An empirical question 
regarding jointness is whether the jointness is true, or whether the jointness is temporary or 
permanent (non-joint technology appear joint in the short run due to fixed inputs or joint 
technology appear non-joint). 
 
2.3.2 Complementarity  
Production in agriculture can also comprise complementarity relationships between outputs 
and inputs, and inputs and outputs amongst each other. Complementarity between private and 
public good outputs should be distinguished from their jointness, although both result in a 
degree of positive correlation between outputs. In case of complementarity between two 
outputs, the production of one good contributes to an element of the production of a second 
good (Romstad et al, 2000, 12). Here the concerned element is jointly produced with the first 
output. As such, there is an element of jointness behind complementarity, but the ultimate 
interlinkage of the two outputs is weaker than in case both outputs would have been jointly 
produced. Complementarity often occurs within certain ranges. Beyond these the two 
products might compete for the common factor of production. An example of complementary-
competing relationships might be cultural landscape and agricultural production. Agricultural 
production contributes to an open landscape. Note that in this example agricultural land 
functions both as an input to agricultural production and as a part of the output landscape. In 
that respect open area can be seen as a joint product of agricultural production, with the 
jointness coming from the land input/output use. However, when there would be too much 
agricultural production the landscape might become too open and for that reason be lower 
valued. So open area is for a certain range complementary to agricultural production, where 
at another range both are competing with each other. 
 
 
2.4 Multifunctionality of agriculture and policy-issues 
The concept of multifunctionality was introduced in 1998 at an EU meeting of the agriculture 
ministers in 1998. It refers to the fact that agricultural production has commodity outputs as 
well non-commodity outputs which include its environmental impacts and its contribution to 
rural employment. Beyond its primary function of supplying food and fiber, agricultural activity 
can also shape the landscape, provide environmental benefits such as land conservation, the 
sustainable management of renewable natural resources and the preservation of biodiversity, 
and contribute to the socio-economic viability of many rural areas (e.g. Keyzer et al, 2003). 
Moreover, it plays or might play a role in ensuring food security. As such the multifunctionality 
of agriculture is closely linked with the externalities or public goods attached to agriculture. It 
is often believed that agriculture provides the most typical win-win situation for the combined 
economic growth and enhanced environmental qualities (Vatn, 2002, 309).  
 
In the standard trade theory, with perfect competition, no transaction costs, and only private 
(no public) goods, the standard result is that free trade secures the highest level of welfare 
and economic growth for all parties or countries involved (i.e. comparative advantage 
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theorem). However, the real world is more complex than this standard model, with public 
goods and bads existing alongside private goods. Moreover, in general externalities play a 
non-negligible role. The policy debate focuses on rational trade rules for a production process 
that gives both private and public outputs (Vatn 2002). The moot point is whether it is rational 
to have free trade for the private goods, while paying separately for the public ones. It is 
generally acknowledged in the literature that the existence of negative and/or positive 
externalities will affect welfare and might provide a reason of government interference. The 
traditional answer to externalities is to introduce corrective taxes or subsides in order to 
‘internalize’ the externality (e.g. Baumol and Oates, 1988) 2. As is shown by Paarlberg et al 
(2002, 328) corrective policies (Pigovian taxes and subsidies3) should be made in such a 
ways as to include all the externality impacts (both positive and negative). The dominant 
conclusion from the environmental economics literature is to keep policies aiming at 
influencing externalities detached from trade policy (see Paarlberg et al, 2002) because the 
impact of trade and trade liberalization on a country’s overall welfare depends on whether the 
countries natural resources are correctly priced, which in return depends on whether 
appropriate environmental policies are in place. If such environmental policy is not in place, 
i.e., natural resources are not correctly priced (e.g., prices are lower than the opportunity 
costs of natural resources), the price mechanism will lead to overexploitation of resources and 
deterioration of the environment. In this case, free trade is likely to increase the negative 
effect through increased production volume. However, the problem is induced by the incorrect 
pricing of natural resources rather than by trade liberalization. As such trade is a magnifier of 
the negative effect, not a cause in itself (see Anderson and Blackhurst, 1992, also in Vatn 
(2002)). 
 
An intriguing question is whether the trade rules following from the standard trade model still 
hold in case private and public goods are connected in production. In principle it could be 
argued that this result then also holds. However, as is argued by Vatn (2002) in some specific 
cases their might exist a trade-off where implications for the trade policy cannot be excluded. 
Two main issues required for this to happen are jointness and transaction costs. If private and 
public goods are interrelated in production and there are significant transaction costs, then it 
may not be rational to have free trade for the private good, while separately paying for the 
public ones. Vatn (2002) argues that in such a situation it could be the case that the efficiency 
loss due to introducing a trade distortion on the private good might be less than the reduction 
in transaction costs associated with the jointly produced public good provision. 
 
As is shown by both Paarlberg et al (2002) and Vatn (2002) this issue could be brought one 
step further. When private and public goods are interrelated, the free trade market equilibrium 
can no longer be argued to be optimal. It might be possible by restricting trade (for example 
by introducing price distortions) to get an alternative equilibrium for which the gains in public 
goods dominate the welfare loss at the private tradable goods markets. The prime technical 
issue here is jointness in production. Of course, such an intervening trade policy would affect 
trade flows and by that the welfare of third countries. This introduces a prime value question 
about whose right should be defended when countries have conflicting interests; the one 
                                                   
2  Later on this result was questioned by the contribution of Coase and his famous theorem. However, the 
practical relevance of Coase’s theorem for the typical agricultural externalities is rather limited (due to 
for example large number of farmers and the high transaction costs associated with achieving 
bargaining agreements. 
3  Named after Arthur Pigou, a British economist who introduced these taxes and subsidies. A Pigovian 
tax is an optimal tax on the (negative) externality generating activity in such a way that the externality is 
properly internalized in economic behavior. The height of the tax should be chosen in such a way that 
Pareto optimality in the economy is restored. (In technical terms this implies that the optimal tax equals 
the marginal externality at the optimal solution). 
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protecting its public goods or the one that faces reduced export possibilities (Paarlberg et al. 
2002).  
Discussion on multifunctionality converged on three issues: 1) production relationships 
underlying the multiple outputs of agriculture and the externality and public goods aspects of 
these outputs; 2) methodological and empirical issues related to the measurement of the 
demand for non-commodity outputs, criteria and procedures for specifying domestic policy 
objectives, and mechanisms for evaluating progress; 3) policy aspects of multifunctionality, 
including its implications for policy reform and trade liberalization.  
 
The nature and degree of jointness in the production of commodity and non-commodity 
outputs is the principal issue on the production side of multifunctionality. Jointness adds two 
new elements. First, any change in commodity production entails a change in the levels of the 
non-commodity outputs that are jointly produced with commodities. Secondly, jointness can 
create possibilities for economies of scope, i.e., cost savings generated through the joint 
provision of several outputs as opposed to their separate provision. 
 
It is crucial to establish the extent to which the non-commodity outputs of agriculture are 
linked to or can be dissociated from commodity production. This has important implications 
for policy targeting and decoupling. Economies of scale arise if something inherent in the 
production process makes it cheaper to provide two or more outputs jointly rather than 
separately. It is important to identify the factors that determine whether or not there are 
economies of scope in the joint provision of commodity and non-commodity outputs by 
agriculture. If a technical interdependency is at the root of jointness, a change in the technical 
relationship is the most direct way of changing the supply of the non-commodity output (OECD 
2001). An important policy issue is how to induce these changes. 
 
A final issue on the supply side of multifunctionality is whether some non-commodity outputs 
can be supplied at a lower cost by non-agricultural providers. In this context it is important to 
know whether the non-commodity outputs can be separated from agricultural production and 
resource use. 
 
 
2.5 Coupling and decoupling of support policy 
It is well observed that public income support programmes can influence production 
decisions. There is an extensive body of literature investigating the effect of decoupled 
payment on production decisions. A great deal of uncertainty remains about how lump-sum 
payments influence production. A general consensus is that lump-sum payments have no 
effect on production with complete and perfect markets. Distortions can occur due to various 
market imperfections: incomplete labor markets, transaction costs, credit constraints, risk 
attitude (Hennessy 1998) and the effect of nonpecuniary benefits (Key and Roberts 2009).  
 
Despite the extensive literature, questions concerning the compatibility of multifunctionality 
with market liberalization remain deeply unresolved (Potter and Tilzey 2007). Support 
measures can influence the quantity of production through several channels (Zahrnt 2009): 
• Prices: Policies that raise producer prices apparently stimulate outputs. 
• Risks: Any agricultural policy that increases farmers’ wealth encourages production if, as is 
likely, wealthier farmers are less risk-averse. Specifically risk-diminishing payments induce 
additional production among risk-averse farmers.  
• Credit: If farmers are credit constrained, any payment increases output. First, farmers can 
directly channel the payments into production. Second, farmers gain better access to 
credit, under the condition that support is likely to continue well into the future (thus 
reducing bankruptcy risks and driving up land values that can serve as collateral). 
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• Structure: Support measures influence the structure of production. On the one hand, 
marginal producers may stay in business if part of the fixed costs can be financed through 
support programs, (and they may even export at world prices ) (see, e.g. Parks 1995). On 
the other hand, support measures may enable new investments which lead to increasing 
scale of production. 
• Expectations: if farmers expect that entitlements for decoupled payments might be updated 
in the future, they are enticed to build reference quantities. 
 
Based on its policy evaluation model and a series of empirical studies, the OECD (2006) 
concludes that production and trade effects differ strongly across policy instruments: 
• Area-based payments are least distorting; 
• Market Price Support (MPS) and output payments have a similar distorting effect that is 
significantly higher than area-based payments; 
• Subsidies on variable input are the most distorting policy instrument. 
 
However, these conclusions are drawn without taking into account of externalities. 
Considerations on externalities and their impact on national welfare raise the question whether 
the ‘distortive effects’ are justified on ground of welfare maximizing (see, e.g. Blandford et al. 
2000). 
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3 Public policy and private decision making: 
theoretical background 
3.1 Public policy and the provision of public goods 
Externality is one of the main causes for so-called market failure and is often used as 
justification for policy intervention. Traditionally, the treatment to externality is to introduce 
corrective taxes or subsides (Pigouvian taxes or subsidies) to ‘internalize’ the externalities 
(Baumol and Oates 1988). This once dominant view was challenged by Coase (1960), who 
pointed out that the real choice was not between an inefficient market and an efficient 
government solution but rather among a variety of inefficient alternatives, private and 
governmental. In Coase's words: "All solutions have costs and there is no reason to suppose 
that government regulation is called for simply because the problem is not well handled by the 
market or the firm". 
 
While the Pigouvian approach targeted at the generators of externality, Coase’s treatment of 
externality dealt with the reciprocal nature of the problem. The analysis brought forward the 
role of the recipients of externalities and private initiatives such as negotiation in solving 
externality problems. As the example of the two neighboring farmers (cattle farmer and crop 
farmer), negotiation between the recipient and generator of externalities (straying cattle 
destroying crops) can result in efficient outcome when transaction costs are ignored. 
However, private initiatives such as negotiation may not lead to Pareto efficient outcomes 
when the number of recipients is large, due to high transaction costs and free-rider problem. 
Therefore, as Baumol and Oates (1988) pointed out, the importance of Coase’s contribution 
does not undermine the relevance of public intervention as most environmental problems or 
resource problems concern large number of recipients. 
 
Based on the nature and policy relevance, Table 3 provides a taxonomy of various 
externalities. In general, the externalities that are relevant to public policy are the ‘public good’ 
varieties involving large number of recipients. The relevance, however, is only a necessary 
condition for policy intervention since policy intervention may have its own ‘failures’ as will be 
explained later. As Table 3 shows (see top line and most left column) in case of a positive 
externality and excludability, there is no need (not relevant) for policy interference. As 
explained before, the reason is that pecuniary externalities are in general well taken into 
account in market exchanges so that no further policy correction is needed. Other cells can 
be read in a similar way. 
 
Public intervention is not automatically justified if the ‘good’ is identified as ‘public good’ or 
‘market failure’ exists. As noted in academic debate, the discussion whether market or 
government can do better is misleading (Holcombe 1997; Hausman 2008). Government 
intervention with respect to a specific market faces major problems: a) Administrative costs; 
b) Lack of information; c) Rent-seeking; d) Unforeseen consequences for other markets; e) 
inflexibility; and f) corruption. After Coase, it is widely accepted that government as well as 
market can ‘fail’. Whether policy intervention and which type of policy intervention is desirable 
has to be based on cost and benefit analysis of alternatives and the nature and implications of 
the externalities.  
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Table 3: A taxonomy of externalities and their policy relevance (whether there is or is not a need for 
corrective government action) 
Effect Positive externality Negative externality 
Characteristics Excludable Non- 
excludable 
Depletable Non-depletable 
Pecuniary Not relevant*) Not relevant Not relevant Not relevant 
N
at
ur
e 
Technical Not relevant Relevant Not relevant Relevant 
Small 
number  
Not relevant 
 
Not relevant 
 
Not relevant 
 
Not relevant  
N
um
be
r 
of
 
re
ci
pi
en
ts
 
Large 
number  
Relevant Relevant Relevant Relevant 
*)  See main text for interpretation of cells. “Not relevant” means that in principle (from an efficiency 
perspective) no government action is required. 
 
Teulings et al. (2003) analyzed the necessity and form of policy intervention and provided 
guidelines for the selection of public intervention. Figure 3 shows the roadmap they proposed 
in determining the necessity and selecting the proper form and instruments of policy 
intervention. When transactions cause no externalities, market intervention is not necessary. 
When externalities are of a simple nature, they can be left to private initiatives such as 
negotiation (c.f. Coase). Even though complex externalities with free-rider problem exist, it 
remains to be determined whether it pays to internalize the externalities through public 
intervention. The problems mentioned above can make it preferable to tolerate market failure 
because government intervention can fail as well. 
 
When public intervention is necessary, Figure 3 indicates different forms of intervention, which 
imply different types of relationships between the government and the concerned agents. The 
intervention arrangements vary from regulation to in-house production by the public sector. It 
is important to note that different relationships entail different information needs for the 
administrator and incentive schemes for the concerned agents. Choice of intervention forms 
and instruments depends on their feasibility and implementation costs, which can be strongly 
influenced by the behavior of the concerned agents in terms of compliance or participation. In 
the face of information problem, a principal-agent (eg. policymaker-farmer) type intervention 
may induce opportunistic behavior. A partnership relationship, for example, may encourage 
efforts for mutual benefits. Good attention should therefore be paid to possible behavior of the 
concerned agents in choosing public intervention4.  
 
Government as an institution plays a key role in organizing the provision of public goods by 
setting public good policy and using policy instruments. The types of public goods, social 
values and ability to estimate economic values of the public goods affect the selection of 
public good policy and policy goals. Consequently, the choice of policy instruments depends 
on the policy goals, and should in principle change to the broader societal goals. A good 
overview of policy instruments can be found in Cubbage et al. (2007), ranging from free 
markets, to education and research, to incentives, to regulation, to government ownership 
and allocation.  
 
                                                   
4  Further treatment of this issue is beyond the scope of this research project. See also Jongeneel et al 
(2009), which provides the results of a counterpart of this project and provides an alternative 
evaluation scheme for assessing the match between policy objectives and instrument use in the domain 
of biodiversity, water, and environment. 
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Source: Teulings et al. (2003, P201) 
Figure 3: The calculus of public interests 
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3.2 Agri-environment policy 
Public good policy related to agriculture aims to stimulate the provision of many environmental 
amenity services by agriculture and is commonly referred to as agri-environment policy. 
Agriculture is an atypical sector in terms of production and marketing due to the use of land 
and the connection between land and landscape. One justification of public support to 
agriculture is that the social values of agricultural is not paid. These social values include the 
reduction of negative externalities (some of which are ‘public bads’) and the generation of 
positive externalities (some of which are public goods). The difficulties faced by policies 
aiming at internalized externalities are the jointness of production. 
 
In dealing with negative externalities such as pollution, a well-known principle in environment 
economics is the ‘polluter pays principle’ (OECD 1979). Similarly, public policy on the provision 
of public goods as positive externalities operates on the ‘producer gets principle’, i.e., 
producers of public goods receive remuneration for their inputs (Hanley et al. 1998). 
Economic analysis of a policy that remunerates provision of public goods would require 
information on both the supply price and demand price (willingness to pay). Supply price would 
be expected to vary across farmers, because of heterogeneity in farms and public goods 
which lead to different opportunity costs for the supplier (Hanley et al. 1998).  
 
On the demand side, it is up to the policy makers to define the public goods. Public 
consultation can be done through the ‘stated preference methods’. (see e.g : (Brower 2008). 
The most known stated preference methods are the contingent valuation methods. (CVM) and 
choice experiment. Stated preference methods are used in contrast to revealed preference, 
which are based on the observed behavior of the consumer.  
 
One of the ‘market failures’ in supplying public goods is that a market for the public goods is 
missing. Government intervention can however create a market-like mechanism which induces 
the farmer to internalize costs or to receive remuneration for their contribution. There may be 
limits to what can reasonably be achieved by means of agri-environment contracts. Alternative 
social arrangements are suggested, for example, the role of non-profit organizations, 
donations etc. (Hodge 2001). 
 
 
3.3 Challenges in the design of agri-environmental policy  
Challenges faced by policy intervention are essentially due to two problems: information 
problem and value problem.  
 
3.3.1 Information problem 
Within the scope of agri-environmental policy, the most central public goods elements are 
landscape values (biodiversity, cultural heritage, amenity value of the landscape, etc.), food 
related aspects (food security, food safety, and food quality) and rural activities (rural 
settlement and economic activities) (Romstad et al. 2000). These goods are normally site or 
region specific5. Effective regulation and taxes require that politicians and regulators have 
information not only about social costs and optimal levels of production, but also about the 
(often varying) private production and compliance costs of individual users. This is a 
requirement that few regulators can meet.  
                                                   
5  The counterpart project (see previous footnote) further explores the spatial aspect and the 
implications for policy making this raises. 
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A challenge to policy is that the economic valuation of many ‘public goods’. Stated preference 
methods are often used to estimate the willingness to pay of the public, such as biodiversity 
(Christie et al. 2006) , landscape (Hanley et al. 2007). 
 
As commonly observed in the literature on public goods, public goods yield private prices in 
the sense that the marginal costs and benefits of public goods are unknown to the ‘public’ or 
the public administrator. Theory of mechanism design demonstrated that efficient provision of 
public goods can be achieved by mimicking markets. Policies that contain signaling 
mechanisms of prices such as auctions facilitate economically more efficient decisions for the 
producers (Romstad 2008). A major challenge for public policy is therefore how to design the 
institutional framework.  
 
3.3.2 Value problem and additionality 
The value problem of public policy concerns moral and ethical standards that are used to 
make and judge the policy, in particular, issues such as rights and fairness can come into 
play.  
 
The rights issue is particularly relevant to externalities. When negative externalities are 
generated by the use of privately owned resources such as land, it can be argued whether the 
generator should be punished since he has the right to use the resources. As pointed out by 
Coase, the problem of externalities has a reciprocal nature. The problem would cease to exist 
when there is no presence of the receiver. Whether the right of the generator (to use his 
resources) or the right of the receiver (not to be harmed) should be protected constitutes a 
value problem which requires political resolution. 
 
With regard to fairness, one well known issue is the additionality criterion, which credits or 
rewards economic entities only for undertaking actions or projects that are motivated by a 
given policy. Actions or projects that have happened or will occur anyway (i.e., without the 
policy) are not rewarded even though they achieve the same goal of the policy. An important 
policy issue related to additionality is that the choice of baseline can ‘penalize good actors for 
doing the right thing early’. Moral hazard can arise as a result of the additionality criterion 
since actors may have an incentive to switch back to conventional practice in order to be able 
to again adopt new practice required by the policy.  
 
3.3.3 Payment schemes 
When it is clear that certain public goods are desirable, as is reflected in a positive willingness 
to pay expressed by society, a next step is as how to provide the means and incentive to 
organize an adequate delivery of these goods (or externalities). As is known from the 
environmental economics literature, in general, it is not trivial whether one should let those 
who receive the benefits of the public goods also to pay for it.  
 
Take as an example, an agriculture causing a positive externality (e.g. a nice landscape). 
Assume the government introduces a Pigovian subsidy aimed at ensuring the delivery of 
landscape services, and equal to the marginal social benefit caused by agriculture’s positive 
externality. As a result agriculture is likely to introduce certain activities aimed at an optimal 
delivery of the landscape services. With the subsidy level properly chosen the provision of 
landscape services level would be optimal, i.e. a level in accordance with the society’s 
(positive) valuation. Given that an attractive landscape is produced the beneficiaries undertake 
certain actions or activities (for example spent holidays in own region rather than elsewhere; 
some people living in the country might try to move to the attractive landscape). It can be 
proved that the induced level of ‘consumption’ activities that will be undertaken at this optimal 
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level of delivery landscape services by the beneficiaries is just efficient (Baumol and Oates, 
1988, 20 and 43). Note that the private actions made by individual beneficiaries do not 
change the level of ‘consumption’ of noise by other beneficiaries (public good). 
 
As an alternative the government could try to impose a tax on the beneficiaries6, for example 
with the aim to finance the Pigovian subsidy given to agriculture. When the government would 
introduce a (consumption-)tax on the people living in the landscape, for example, less people 
valuing landscape are likely to move into the attractive region than in case without a tax. This 
is irrespective of the level of the public good provided. So the net impact of the tax on 
beneficiaries could be to reduce their level of consumption. Too few people would choose to 
enjoy the landscape services. This is clearly inefficient, because more people could enjoy the 
landscape without their consumption being at the cost of anyone else’s consumption (NB 
landscape is here interpreted to be a real public good). This result is a specific translation of a 
more general result derived by Baumol and Oates (1988, Chapter 4):  
In the presence of an externality, optimal resource allocation calls for pricing that 
involves zero taxation and zero compensation to those affected by the externalities 
(but non-zero taxation of their generators). 
 
There are some exemptions to this general rule, in particular when the number of recipients 
(victims or beneficiaries) is small7, or the externality is shiftable. The main lesson is that 
introducing a general price (or price distortion) cannot do the job. In cases like this price 
asymmetry is required: a non-zero (positive or negative) price for the generator of the 
externality and a zero-price for the victim or beneficiary of the externality. Ordinary prices by 
their nature are symmetric between supplies and consumers. Only Pigovian taxes (negative 
externality) or subsidies (positive externality) satisfy this asymmetry criterion and therefore can 
be candidates for an efficient solution (Baumol and Oates, 1988, 29). 
 
 
 
                                                   
6  For example, this could be a tax on all people living in the landscape, or a tax on people which are 
visiting the landscape for its attractiveness (e.g. a tourist tax). 
7 This now famous argument was raised by Coase (1985). 
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4 Impact of Policy Instruments on Farmer’s Behavior: 
A Formal Analysis  
4.1 Conceptual model of farmer’s participation decision 
Farm decision making has distinct features due to the use of natural resources which can 
cause externalities and quasi-fixed inputs that can lead to jointness of production. At the same 
time, farming is a business which interacts with the market through commodity inputs and 
outputs. An overview of the relationships is shown in Figure 4.  
Figure 4. Internal and external linkage of agricultural production 
 
Economic theory suggests that behavior is driven by a rich set of attitudes, values and 
preferences (Becker 1993). An increasing literature suggests that behavior of farmers is not 
driven only by the maximization of profits (e.g. Willock et al. 1999; Wynn et al. 2001; Dupraz 
et al. 2003; Defrancesco et al. 2008; Jongeneel et al. 2008). A strict profit maximization 
framework fails to encompass other values, beliefs, attitudes and intentions that can greatly 
influence economic behavior. A theory of behavior is needed to link psychological processes 
to economic decisions (Lynne et al. 1988). In other words, economic modeling needs to 
incorporate values, beliefs, attitudes and intentions of the decision-maker and integrate socio-
economic psychological and farming variables into a comprehensive framework. Based on 
Vanslembrouck et al. (2002), such a framework is constructed and shown in Figure 5.  
 
The central assumption of the conceptual model is that farmer’s behavior is not only 
influenced by farmer and farm characteristics, but also by the characteristics of the 
requirement practices, and the payment scheme. Incentives and constraints that determine 
the participation decisions are formed by the decision context as well as intrinsic motivation of 
the farmer. 
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Figure 5. Conceptual model of the participation decision 
 
 
4.2 Incentive for the agricultural producer 
The conceptual model highlights the joint role of intrinsic motivation and decision context in 
shaping the incentives and constraints of participation decision (Table 4). The decision context 
refers to the characteristics of the decision subject, which consist of so-called scheme 
characteristics (characteristics of policy instruments) and market characteristics. Farm and 
farmer’s characteristics determine farmer’s intrinsic motivation to participate in the provision 
of public goods. This conceptual model can accommodate the observation that contribution to 
public goods can be motivated by intrinsic factors such as warm glow altruism and fairness, 
as well as extrinsic incentives such as sanctions and payments. Including attitudes in the 
conceptual model allows the consideration of non-pecuniary benefits of farming such as 
personal enjoyment of working on-farm, moral satisfaction through countryside stewardship 
(taking care of soil quality, biodiversity and landscape). 
 
Theoretical and empirical evidence show that economic decisions are shaped by a range of 
motivations. It is sometimes observed that private contribution to public goods are not 
motivated by economic costs and benefits alone, but that people also have a moral or norm-
based motivation. When ranges of motivations are present, a point of attention in the design of 
public good policy is the possible ‘crowding out’ effect of policy intervention. Psychological 
studies suggest that formal extrinsic incentives may crowd out intrinsic motivations (Reeson 
and Tisdell 2008). Some of the ideas from evolutionary biology indicates that provision of 
public goods can be an altruistic act out of the farmer’s concern for the well-being of the 
society (Manner and Gowdy 2008). In this case, policy intervention may unintendedly crowd-
out private provision of public goods.  
 
 
Policy instrument
- Requirements
- Time horizon
- Payment scheme 
Participation decision
Market characteristics
- Demand for commodity
- Prices (volatility)
Individual farmer charac teristics
- Attitude, value, belief
- Age, educat ion
- Etc.
Farm enterprise characteristics
- Size and structure
- Location, region
- F uture perspective
Intrinsic motivation
Decision-maker Characteristics
Decision Subject Characteristics
Decision context
Incentives Constraints
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Table 4: Incentives, constraints and indicative impacts generated by typical policy instruments  
Policy instruments Incentives and constraints 
 Pecuniary  Non-pecuniary 
1. Area payment based on flat 
rate per hectare 
- Increasing on-farm income 
- Reducing risk 
Dedicating more time to working 
on-farm 
2. Area payment with 
differentiated rate per soil 
type 
- Increasing on-farm income 
- Reducing risk 
 
- Dedicating more time to working on-
farm 
- Better taking care of soil quality 
3. Compensation scheme 
based on cross 
compliance (fixed) 
- Increasing income 
possibility 
- Possible cost saving by 
adapting production 
technology 
- Dedicating more time to working 
on-farm 
- Using environmental friendly 
technology 
 
4. Compensation scheme 
(reward based on public 
goods outputs) 
- Increasing on-farm income 
possibilities 
- Possible cost saving by 
adapting production 
technology 
- Possible cost saving by 
adapting production 
technology 
- Increasing level of environmental 
goods 
- Dedicating more time to working 
on-farm 
- Using environmental friendly 
technology 
 
 
 
4.3 The economic model 
A utility maximization framework is used to understand and model producer behavior with 
respect to the provision of public goods. Consider that the agricultural producer’s utility is 
determined by his monetary income (profit from production of marketed commodities, supply 
family labor to off-farm labor market, and net reward from provision of public goods), non-
pecuniary benefits from on-farm production activities and leisure. Denote the utility function for 
a producer j as ),,( RBIu j  
with: 
I  =  monetary income;  
B  =  non-pecuniary benefits of farm production, modeled as a function of family labor 
used for on-farm production;  
R  =  Leisure. 
 
The superscript j is dropped when only one producer is considered. The form of the utility 
function is shaped by the farmer’s value, attitude, and belief and differs therefore among 
farmers.  
 
Following (Key and Roberts 2009), we also use an additive utility form, i.e.: 
 
)()()(),,( rRhBIURBIu ++= , 
 
where:  
FvlxqmwpyI −−−+= ,  
with 
y  =  marketed outputs (vector of marketed outputs in case of multiple outputs) 
32 WOt-werkdocument 203 
p =  output price (vector of output prices in case of multiple outputs) 
w =  wage at the labor market 
l =  amount of land 
m =  off-farm labor work 
r =  leisure time  
h =  family labor used for on-farm production 
x =  marketed variable input (vector of marketed inputs in case of multiple inputs, 
including hired labor) 
q =  input price (vector of input prices in case of multiple inputs) 
v = fixed costs per hectare, these are fixed costs related to the use of land 
F = fixed costs per farm, examples of the fixed costs are for example maintenance 
costs of machinery, rent costs for buildings, etc.  
 
Further, we assume  
0,0 pf III UU ;  
0,0 pf hhh BB ; and  
0,0 pf rrr RR ,  
indicating a concave utility function and aversion of risk when income or other benefits are 
uncertain.  
 
Family labor is modeled as an allocable fixed input which, when used for agricultural 
production, can bring non-pecuniary benefits to the farmer8. Family labor can also be 
employed in the labor market (off-farm work), in that case, the producer receives wage 
income from supplying the labor to the labor market9. Hired non-family labor is considered as 
marketed input. 
 
To simplify the analysis, capital constraint is not considered. Instead, it is assumed that the 
farmer has perfect access to the capital market and capital is a marketed input with known 
prices. It should be noted that high debt ratio can lead to solvency problem for the farm. This 
can be extremely relevant in economic recession when it becomes difficult to obtain credit. 
Incentive to increase income may become overweigh by other considerations when there is 
severe capital constraint. 
 
Considering the interconnectedness of the two production activities through fixed inputs (land 
and labor) and other possible technical interdependence, denote the joint production 
technology as:  
 
0);,,,,( =zxhlQyF  
 
where  
Q refers to non-commodity outputs (possible public goods that are valued by the society) and 
z indicates resource conditions such as soil quality. The joint production technology implies a 
production function for the commodity as:  
 
);,,( zxhlfy =  
 
                                                   
8  This could be further refined as having the farmer getting different non-pecuniary benefits from 
traditional marketed outputs y and non-commodity outputs Q. 
9  There might also be non-pecuniary benefits associated with off-farm employment, but this is ignored. 
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and a production function for the non-commodity good:  
 
);,,( zxhlgQ =  
 
Both production functions refer to the frontier of the production possibility sets. 
Depending on the interconnectedness of public goods production and commodity production, 
production inputs xhl ,,  may or may not be allocable to the two production activities. When 
inputs are allocable or distinguishable, they are subscript with ‘1’ for commodity production 
and with ‘2’ for public good production.  
 
Based on Romstad et al. (2000), the relationships between the two production functions can 
be described within the framework of output possibility sets and functional relations. In terms 
of output possibility sets, interconnectedness between private goods and public goods can 
demonstrate complementarity or competing relationship, as shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Interconnectedness of commodity and non-commodity production in terms of output 
possibility sets 
Interconnectedness Competing Complementary 
Commodity );,,( 111 zxhlfy =  );,,( 111 zxhlfy =  
Non-commodity );,,( 222 zxhlgQ =  );,,( 222 zxhlgQ =  
Output relationship 
0<
dy
dQ
 0>
dy
dQ
 
 
Complementarity between production of private goods and public goods means that increased 
private goods production expands the production possibility set for public goods production 
and vice versa. See Figure 6 for a graphical illustration: the left part of the production 
possibility curve shows an increase in Q with an increase in y (e.g. 0/ >∂∂ yQ ) i.e. 
complementarity. This means that policy support that increases private goods production will 
favour the production of public goods. On the other hand, a competing relationship means that 
increased public goods production causes a downwards/inwards shift of the production 
frontier of private goods, which means that the producer will be reluctant to increase public 
goods production. In Figure 6 this is illustrated for the region where y is greater than c. 
Identifying complementarity and competing relationship is therefore highly relevant in 
stimulating the provision of public goods. As Figure 6 also illustrates the trade-off between the 
private and public output may not be constant, but could change with changing levels of 
private output y. Finally, Figure 6 (see lower right part) suggests that with very low levels of Q 
there might be complementarity: gains in Q can be easily realized without harming private 
output y10.  
 
 
                                                   
10  Figures like this one are easily drawn (see also Romstad et al, 2000) but should be treated with care 
if there is no supporting underlying formal analysis. In general the non-convex parts of a technology 
belong to the so-called non-economic region. For example, even in the case of a zero remuneration 
for Q (which would imply a vertically sloped relative price line) the optimal output mix would be a point 
in the non-complementary regions. In other words, the economic part is in general limited to the fat 
part of the PPF. 
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Figure 6: Trade-off between Q and y and the production possibility curve PPC 
 
Within the functional framework, public goods production and private goods production may 
shown jointness through the use of inputs or the choice of production methods (Table 6). The 
existence of different forms of jointness means that the provision of different public goods may 
have different impact on the production of private goods and entail different choice problems. It 
is therefore important to distinguish the specific form of jointness in modelling farmer’s decision 
making with regard to the provision of public goods (non-commodity outputs).  
 
Table 6: Functional jointness between commodity and non-commodity production 
Jointness of 
production 
Inputs into production Modes of production 
 Non-allocable 
inputs 
Allocable fixed inputs  
Commodity );,,( zxhlfy =  );,,( 111 zxhlfy =  );,,( zxhlfy i= , 
where i indicates a 
production mode. 
Non-commodity );,,( zxhlgQ =  );,,( 222 zxhlgQ = , 
with 
;
;
;
21
21
21
xxx
hhh
lll
=+
=+
=+
 
)(igQ =  
Technical relationship 
0>
dy
dQ
 
dy
dQ
depends on  
(.)f and (.)g  
dy
dQ
depends on the 
production mode 
 
Jointness through the use of inputs can occur when inputs are non-allocable (for example, 
animal as input for meat and manure) or allocable fixed inputs (i.e., land can be allocated to 
arable production or set-aside, but the total area of land is fixed.). When inputs are non-
allocable, public goods are simultaneously produced with private goods, for example, grass 
Q 
y
 y and Q behave
complementary
y and Q are 
competing 
y=c
PPC
Y and Q behave 
complementary 
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and meadow landscape use the same land. Policy instruments that increase the production of 
private goods will automatically increase public goods. For allocable fixed inputs, allocating 
part of a fixed input to public good production restricts the use of the input for private goods 
production. It does not necessarily follow that the production of private goods will be reduced 
due to possible substitution among inputs. The impact of public good production on private 
good production depends therefore on the specific shapes of the two production functions. 
Jointness through production mode means that public goods is a feature of certain production 
mode (for example, different farming system). In this case, provision of public goods requires 
switching among different production possibility sets (applying different production techniques 
or different farming styles), rather than within one possibility set. 
 
 
4.4 Farmer’s behavior in the provision of public goods  
Different policy instruments pose different decision problem to the farmer and consequently 
induce different behavior. In general, following decisions are made with respect to a certain 
policy scheme:  
• Whether to participate in the policy scheme (participation decision); This decision implies 
that the policy scheme is offered once-only.  
• When to participate in the provision of public goods (timing decision); This decision is 
relevant when the policy scheme has a lasting, or multi-period nature, i.e., the participation 
decision can be made in the next period.  
• How to participate in the provision of public goods (intensity decision), i.e.: 
- Technology choice (input use, intensive or extensive) 
- Land allocation (according to the quality of land, location) 
- Labor allocation (leisure, on-farm labor and off-farm employment) 
 
To understand the farmer’s reference point, it is important to gain insight into the baseline 
situations of the farmer without participation in the policy scheme for the public goods 
provision both in present and in the future. The decisions a farmer makes not only concerns 
current situation, but also may have consequences for the future. Both current situation and 
future expectations are important in farmer’s decision making and should be considered. 
Expectation of the future plays a central role in rational choice theory, especially when 
decision-making involves choice under risk and uncertainty. The analysis that follows deals 
with situations without risk and uncertainty. In Chapter 5, considerations of risk and 
uncertainty will be introduced. 
 
4.4.1 Farmer’s basis situation without remuneration 
Consider the basis situation in which there is no remuneration for the provision of public 
goods, the producer solves his utility maximization problem as follows:  
 
111 ,,, xmhl
Maximize  )()()(),,( rRhBIURBIu ++= , 
subject to: 
;0,,,,
;
;
≥
=++
≤
xrmhl
Hrmh
Al
 
where:  
vlFxqmwzQxhlpfI −−−+= );,,,( . (1) 
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with  
A  = total land area (endowment, in hectare);  
H  = total available family labor (endowment, in hours).  
 
The Lagrangian is:  
 
)()()()()(),,,,( rmhHAlrRhBIUxrmhlL −−−+−−++= μλ  (2) 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for this problem are: 
 
a) Land allocation 
a1)  ;0)( =−−= λvpfUL lIl  (3) 
a2)  ;0≥λ (non-negativity constraint) (4) 
a3)  Al ≤  (feasibility constraint)  (5) 
a4)  ;0)( =− Alλ (Complementary slackness) (6) 
 
Interpretation: If land is not a binding factor, i.e., 0=λ , condition a1) becomes 
vpfvpfU llI =⇒=− 0)( , the farmer uses land for commodity production up to the point 
where the value of the marginal product equals the fixed cost per hectare. This implies that 
when the value of the marginal product is lower than the fixed cost (for example, due to low 
soil fertility or high rent for land, or high land price), the farmer may abandon the land (fallow 
or sell). 
 
In the case when land is binding, i.e., 0>λ , land is fully employed in commodity production 
( Al = ). The shadow price of land equals the marginal utility derived from the marginal profit, 
i.e., )( vpfU AI −=λ . This condition suggests that the opportunity cost of land when 
allocated to public good production depends both on land use intensity (marginal productivity 
of land) for commodity production and level of monetary income. Since farmer’s marginal 
utility decreases with the level of income (i.e., 0pIIU ), farmers with higher income would 
have lower opportunity cost than farmers with lower level of income, given the same level of 
land use intensity. Similarly, farmers with higher land use intensity have lower opportunity 
costs than farmers with lower land use intensity, given same level of income. This implies that 
for the same level of compensation, farmers with higher level of income and high land use 
intensity will be more prone to accept the compensation than farmers with lower level of 
income and lower land use intensity.  
 
b) Labor allocation on farm, off-farm and leisure 
b1)  0=−+= μhhIh BfpUL ; (7) 
b2)  0=−=−= μμ ImIm wUIUL ; (8) 
b3)  0=−= μrr RL ; (9) 
Interpretation: From b1), b2) and b3, we have: rIhhI RwUBpfU ==+=μ . The shadow 
price of family labor is the sum of utility derived from marginal production value and marginal 
non-pecuniary benefits derived from working on farm.  
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c) Input use  
c1)  0)(
111
=−== qpfUIUL xIxIx ; (10) 
 
Since 0fIU , this gives 01 =− qpf x , which simply states that the value of the marginal 
product of input equals its market price. 
 
To gain insight in the possible impacts of policy instruments on the allocation of quasi-fixed 
inputs, we can look at the comparative statics of the key variables. For example, policy 
instruments such as area payment has the effect of reducing v, the fixed cost of production 
per hectare. To gain insight on their possible impact on equilibrium labor allocation, we can 
look at the comparative statics of h and m with respect to the fixed cost v. Assuming interior 
solution, the second order condition gives: 
 
 0)( 2 <++= rrhhhIIhh RBpfUL ; (11) 
 0<+= rrIImm RwUL ; (12) 
 0)( 2 >+−= rrhIImmhh RwfpULLH ; (13) 
Replacing the shadow price )( mhHRRr −−==μ and total differentiating equation 7) and 
8) with respect to mh ,1 andv by replacing the shadow price with )( mhHRRr −−==μ , 
using Cramer’s rule, we have: 
 
 0
)( <−=
H
wpfUR
dv
dh hIIrr  (14) 
 0
)()( 2 >−++=
H
wpfRUBfpUwU
dv
dm hrrIIhhhhIII  (15) 
The comparative statics shows that ceteris paribus, an area payment that reduces the 
farmer’s fixed per hectare cost of land would increase on-farm labor and reduces off-farm 
supply. Area payment also influences opportunity costs of land and labor by changing the 
marginal utility of income. The area payment can therefore in the long run change the 
production structure (for example, substitution effect of labor and other inputs).  
 
Based on the analysis above, Table 7 summarizes opportunity costs for key production inputs 
and the factors that can influence these opportunity costs. The information can be used to 
infer farmer’s opportunity cost in participating in a specific policy scheme and understanding 
their participation behaviour.  
 
In the basis situation, a farmer can produce public goods due to three reasons: 
1) Public goods enter the utility function through non-pecuniary benefits; 
2) Public goods do not enter the utility function directly, but forms the shape of the utility 
function through other moral motives such as altruism, responsibility for countryside 
stewardship; 
3) The producer doesn’t derive utility from the public goods, but the public goods is jointly 
produced due to technical interdependency with commodity production. 
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Table 7: Farmer’s opportunity costs for the provision of public goods 
Production inputs Opportunity cost Factors 
Land allocation ( l )   
Al =1  )( vpfU AI −=λ  
Al <1  0=λ  
- Attitudes that determines the shape of 
(.)U ; 
- Income level which determines the 
marginal utility of income; 
- Fixed per hectare cost of land (for 
example, rent) which can shift income 
level and changes the marginal utility 
of income; 
- Commodity prices; 
- Productivity of land  
 (influenced by soil quality, etc.) 
Family labor ( 1h , or r )  
0=m  
This can occur in two 
situations: 
1)  There is no off-farm employm
opportunity; 
2)  The off-farm wage level is 
lower than ( hhI BpfU + ),  
i.e., marginal utility derived  
from the value of marginal  
production of labor on farm 
as well as from non-pecuniary 
benefits of farming. 
r
hhI
R
BpfU
=
+=μ  
0>m  
r
hhI
I
R
BpfU
wU
=
+=
=μ
 
- Attitude that determines the shape of 
(.)u  and B(.), especially, marginal 
utility of monetary income and non-
pecuniary benefits; 
- Commodity prices 
- Marginal productivity of family labor 
on farm 
- Off-farm employment opportunity 
- Age, education etc. which determines 
the possibility of being employed 
off-farm 
- Farm location, which can influence the 
accessibility to labor market and 
therefore the possibility of off-farm 
income 
Variable input ( x ) 
xpfq =  - Commodity prices 
- Marginal productivity of variable inputs 
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4.4.2 Participation decision based on opportunity costs 
Using rational choice theory, the farmer will participate in the policy scheme for the provision 
of public goods if and only if the participation increases the maximized utility 
),,,,,( ****** Qrmxhlu , i.e., 0),,,,,( ****** ≥Qrmxhldu . This requires a close look at 
the necessary changes that must be made to comply the policy and their net impact on the 
utility of the farmer. Based on the utility function of the farm, we have: 
 
drRdxqpfUwdmUdhBpfUdlpfUdu rxIIhhIlI +−++++= )()( ****   
 
and from the first order conditions in 4.4.1, this becomes )(* drdmdhdldu +++= μλ , the 
decision rules states therefore a rational farmer will only participate the policy scheme if the 
use of quasi-fixed inputs is compensated at least at their opportunity costs. It is therefore 
necessary to identify the changes the policy instrument would cause to commodity production 
and compensating them according to their opportunity costs.  
 
Farms and farming practices vary across the country. Heterogeneity of farms and farmers 
implies heterogeneity of opportunity costs and production possibilities. For example, need for 
farm labor can have seasonal variation. In peak seasons (e.g., sowing or harvesting), the 
supply of farm labor will be higher for arable farming.  
 
Many factors influence farmer’s opportunity costs through commodity production function. For 
example, soil quality differs in different area which leads to variations in land productivity. 
Location of a farm can lead to different transaction costs to the farmer. Location of farm can 
also determine the potential of the farmer as a provider of public goods. For example, public 
goods such as landscape and biodiversity are often only possible in certain regions or certain 
locations. 
 
Some empirical evidence confirmed these theoretical insights. For example, Hynes and Garvey 
(2009) found that farmers associated with a poor soil type are more likely to enter the Irish 
agri-environmental scheme REPS. This highlights the importance of taking into account of 
unobserved heterogeneity of farm- and farmer-specific characteristics when considering the 
opportunity costs of participation in voluntary agri-environmental schemes, or of determining 
the minimum compensation necessary to induce specific groups of farmers, or farmers at a 
specific location to participate. 
 
 
4.5 Policy instruments towards provision of public goods 
Targeted policy steps in where markets fail to reach sufficient provision of public goods. 
Traditionally, economic theory recommends externalities to be ‘internalized’ through direct 
control, subsidy and taxes. Relatively new, payment schemes based on the provision of public 
goods are already for some time present in the agricultural policy debate (e.g. the CAP’s Agri-
Environmental (AES) second pillar policies). As another example see Keyzer et al (2003, 37-
39) who offers a suggestion and proposal to transform the EU’s single farm payment scheme 
to a payment scheme for well-defined multifunctional services from agriculture. 
 
Unlike commodity outputs, public goods as non-commodity outputs of agricultural production 
usually do not have well-defined qualities and units. As noted by Cornes and Sander (1996), 
however, public goods and externalities are incentive structures rather being inherently 
associated with certain activities. Identification and specification of the public goods is 
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therefore a critical step in designing policy instruments. When choosing policy instruments, it 
is also important to consider different degrees and mechanisms of the interconnectedness 
between commodity and non-commodity (potentially public good) production, as they can 
enhance or erode the desired effect of the policy instruments. 
 
Table 8 provides a provisional overview, expressing some general expectations about how 
different instruments might affect the provision of public goods as non-commodity production, 
taking into account different possibilities with respect to the connectedness of private and 
public good outputs (competition, complementarity, and jointness). These expectations are 
based on the formal model, as it was presented in the previous paragraphs of this chapter. 
Note that that the model, considered before, analyzes Farmers’ behavior at farm level. As 
such it treats individual farmers as price takers, and does not take into account the market 
effects, as they will arise if all farmers individually behave in a certain way. So, in order to 
analyze the full impact of behavioral changes the farm behavior models should be 
complemented by a model taking into account the market effects. Note further that the policy 
instruments are presented here in a rather abstract way. For a more detailed analysis the 
policy instruments need to be further specified.  
 
Table 8: A provisional overview of possible effects of policy instruments on the provision of public 
goods with different kinds of interconnectedness between commodity and non-commodity 
production (based on a farm model-perspective)  
Interconnectedness of technology F( ) 
Use of inputs 
Policy instruments 
Competing Complementary 
Jointness of outputs 
Flat-rate payment 
 
Reduce Increase Increase 
Land quality specific area 
payment 
Reduce Increase Increase 
Cross compliance (creating 
public goods by restricting 
input use or technology for 
commodity production) 
Increase Reduce Uncertain 
 
Reward scheme based on 
outputs of public goods 
Increase Increase Increase 
 
On the reading of Table 8: introducing a flat-rate payment decoupled with public good 
provision in general increases the use of land for commodity production as it functions as a 
subsidy on land (ceteris paribus). If land use for commodity production is competing with land 
use for public good provision, this policy instrument will reduce public provision (see cell in 
first column and first row). On the contrary, if land use for commodity production is 
complementary to the provision of public good (based on the same land), this instrument will 
increase the provision of public goods related to the land (see first row, second column of 
Table 8). When public good is jointly produced with the commodity goods, increased 
commodity production will also increase public good production (see first row and third 
column of Table 8).  
 
Similar reasoning can be made to other policy instruments to derive their possible effects on 
the provision of public good. Being a kind of a land-related subsidy, the land quality specific 
payment shares similarities with a flat rate. If cross compliance restricts a certain input and 
there are alternative competing inputs, the latter might increase as a consequence of a 
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substitution effect. If inputs are complementary they will follow the pattern of the restricted 
input and also being reduced. In case of joined production the final result is ambiguous. There 
are two counteracting tendencies: On the onde hand commodity output is likely to decline and 
then due to jointness for that reason also the public good output. On the other hand, the cross 
compliance policy explicitly targets to increase the public good output, which for that reason 
is likely to increase, thereby leaving the net result undetermined. Reward schemes, which 
directly remunerate the public good activity or production, are likely to increase the supply of 
the public good. In practice it might be rather difficult to implement such policies because of 
difficulties to clearly delimit, measure public goods.  
 
Also the remuneration-schemes need to be specified. In general it makes a difference whether 
payments depend on efforts made (input use) or outputs delivered (performance based 
payment schemes). For an example of a spatially differentiated payments scheme see Hanley 
et al. (2007). Hanley also used choice experiments to estimate the demand of the public for 
different public goods. More discussions can be found in Fraser (Fraser 2009).  
A number of common specifications are described below as examples. Depending on the form 
of the public good and the jointness of production, the inputs (quasi-fixed or variable) are 
sometimes allocable to the two types of production (for example land reserved for nature 
conservation). In that case, they are subscripted with ‘1’ if they are used for the production of 
marketed commodities and ‘2’ for the production of public goods.  
 
1) ),,( xhlgQ = , the public good is jointly produced with commodity production, imposing 
restrictions on the use of variable inputs, for example, fertilizer. Standards or baselines are 
imposed on farmer’s production decision. The compliance restricts the form of the 
production technology. Suppose the restricted production function become 
),,( xhlfy = , or restrictions on input use, e.g., ),,( xhlfy = . The public goods in this 
case are defined as: 
 
⎩⎨
⎧=
complying
complyingnot
Q
,1
,0
 
2)  2lQ = , the public good requires special land allocation (for example, land used for water 
reservoir where commodity production is no longer possible).  
a) Area payment, flat rate; The reward to the provision of public goods is based on the 
area allocated to the provision of public goods. The production function of public 
goods is: 22 )( llgQ == . Income effect: 2)( slQS = , where s denotes the 
payment rate. 
b) Area payment, dependent on land quality. ),( 2 zlgQ = . Income effect: 
i
N
i
ilsQS 2
1
)( ∑
=
= , where is denotes the payment rate corresponding to land quality i and 
N refers to the total type of quality a farmer allocates to public goods production. 
3)  ),,( 22 xhlgQ = , the public good is jointly produced on the land for commodity 
production, with additional input of family labor and variable inputs; This in practice 
corresponds to two types of area payments: flat-rate area payment and differentiated 
area payment according to land quality. 
4)  ),( 22 xhgQ =  the public good requires additional family labor and variable inputs, but 
no additional input of land.  
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4.6 Producer behavior with public goods production: 
participation intensity for buffer strips and set-aside  
As shown in Section 4.5, different types of policy instruments pose different choice problem 
to the farmer and require correspondingly different analysis. In this section, a policy scheme 
which requires agricultural land to be allocated to the public good production (set-aside) is 
used as an illustration. Assume that no additional inputs are needed, we have: 2lQ = . The 
policy scheme requires a maximal land area ( 2l  ha) to be set aside for environmental 
purposes (e.g. by creating certain buffer zones). The farmer’s decision problem becomes: 
 
),,(
,,,,, 22,2111
RBIuMaximize
mxhlxhl
, subject to 
22
21
;
;
ll
Hrmh
All
≤
=++
≤+
 
where  
1112111
111111
);,,,(
);,,,(
vlFqxmwslzQxhlpf
vlFqxmwsQzQxhlpfI
−−−++=
−−−++=
,  
with s as the compensation rate for 2l  .The Lagrangian is:  
 
)()()()()()(
),,,,,('
2221
21
llHrmhAllrRhBIU
xrmhllL
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where ,λ μ  and σ are the Lagrange multipliers. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for this problem 
are: 
 
a’) Land allocation  
a1’)  ;0)('
111
=−−=−−= λλ vpfUvIUL lIlIl  (17) 
a2’)  ;0)()('
22
=+−=+−= σλσλ sUIUL IlIl  (18) 
a3’)  ;0, ≥σλ (non-negativity of land use) (19) 
a4’)  ;0)( 21 =−+ Allλ (complementary slackness) (20) 
a5’)  ;0)( 22 =− llσ (complementary slackness) (21) 
 
From conditions a1’) and a2’) , we have: )(
1lI
pfvsU −+=σ , which gives the shadow price 
of the maximal area 2l allocated to the public goods when compensation rate s. Setting the 
shadow price to zero gives optimal compensation rate which satisfies: vpfs l −= 1 . The 
optimal rate is therefore determined by the difference between the value of the marginal 
product of the land and per hectare fixed cost. 
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b’) Labor allocation  
b1’)  ;0'
111
=−+= μhhIh BpfUL  (22) 
b2’)  0' =−=−= μμ ImIm wUIUL ; (23) 
b3’)  0' =−= μrr RL ; (24) 
 
The first order condition for labor use is the same as in the basis situation, i.e. 
rhhI RBpfU =+= 11μ  . However, equilibrium labor allocation can differ from the 
basis situation since allocating land to public goods production can change 
equilibrium monetary income and lead to substitution of labor for land as production 
inputs. To see the possible effect of s on labor allocation, we can look at the 
comparative statics of 1h with respect to s. Assuming interior solution and total 
differentiating equation (22) with respect to s and 1h  gives: 
 022
21
111
11111 <+
++−=
hIIhhI
hhhhhII
fpUpfU
RBlPfU
ds
dh
  (25) 
This means that a too high compensation rate s may decrease equilibrium on-farm labor.  
 
c’) Input use  
c1’)  0)(1
11
=−== qpfUIUL xIxIx ; 
 (26) 
Condition c’) indicates that the first order condition for input use remains unchanged, i.e., it 
satisfies pqf x /* = . This means that if the provision of public good only requires setting 
land aside, participating in the policy scheme will not lead to the change in the use of variable 
input. 
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5 Extensions of the research: risk, uncertainty, 
information and time  
The analytical framework in Chapter 4 deals with producer’s decision making under certainty, 
assuming a static and riskless decision context. The framework can however be extended to 
take account of risk, uncertainty, and temporal issues. In particular, this chapter addresses 
following issues:  
• Risk related to policy instruments and risk attitudes of agricultural producers;  
• Asymmetric information and policy design; 
• Multi-annual policy instruments;  
• Producer decisions facing multiple policy instruments (synergy and competition). 
 
 
5.1 Risk and risk aversion  
Policy makers and planners need to consider farmers’ risk-averse behavior when setting 
policies and programmes directly affecting the riskiness of farming, such as price 
stabilization. Responses to many other kinds of policy change are also likely to be affected by 
farmers’ risk perception and risk aversion (Hardaker et al. 2004).  
 
Risk attitude can be modeled with the shape of (.)U as well as the arguments of (.)U . The 
shape of the utility function reflects risk aversion. When arguments of the farmer’s utility 
function, i.e., monetary income, non-monetary benefits and leisure time are uncertain, rational 
choice theory states that farmers maximize expected utility. The concave shape of utility 
function from income implies risk aversion, since )],([)]([ IEUIUE >  where E[.] is the 
expectation operator. Risk aversion can explain many seeming irrational use of land (Parks 
1995). Classical rationality is often based on a profit-maximizing framework and perfect 
information. These are, however, two very strong assumptions that do not hold in reality.  
 
It is possible that risk aversion can reduce at higher wealth level, which implies that wealthier 
farmers are likely to be less risk averse than less wealthy farmers. Riskless instruments such 
as area payment increase monetary income of farmer and may reduce risk aversion in other 
production decision. These considerations are used to explain the possible distortive effect of 
policy support measures even though they are decoupled with production. 
 
Another issue related to decision making under risk and uncertainty is the so-called ‘bounded 
rationality’, which is the main issue of the Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). 
According to Prospect Theory, arguments of utility are not the states of wealth (or other 
variables of interest), but the gains and losses of them. Key concepts in prospect theory 
reflect ideas such as reference dependence and loss aversion, which can be particularly 
relevant for the choice of contracts. 
 
 
5.2 Asymmetric information and policy design 
Voluntary contracts are challenged by the information asymmetry: government as the ‘buyer’ 
of the public goods knows less than landowners about the costs of contractual compliance. 
Theory and evidence have suggested the possibility of hidden action. Landowners in such 
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circumstances can use their private information as a source of market power to extract 
informational rents from the policymaker acting as supplier of the contracts. 
 
As regards flat rate payments, for example, it is found that such payments led to a 
concentration of contracts on unproductive lands run by farmers with the lowest land use 
intensities (in other words, farmers with the lowest opportunity costs (Osterberg 1999). 
 
Another potential problem with uniform payment concerns the heterogeneity of land and soil 
quality due to different locations. Without spatial differentiation, least polluting farms are 
mostly likely to participate in public goods production since their opportunity costs are lower. 
Policy mechanisms that reduce informational rents can be broadly classified into three 
categories: 1) gathering more information on landowners in the form of costly-to-fake signals; 
2) relying on screening contracts (self-selection mechanisms); or 3) harnessing competitive 
forces through procurement auctions (Ferraro 2008). In general, these are called revelation 
mechanisms. Compliance rewards are also suggested to stimulate compliance (Yano and 
Blandford 2009). 
 
 
5.3 Multi-annual policy instruments and the option value 
Once the term of the contract has expired, there can be no guarantee that the conservation 
assets will continue to be maintained. Even if government continues to offer a contract, higher 
agricultural prices or new market opportunities may persuade farmers to return to more 
intensive forms of agricultural production at the expense of any conservation benefits that 
have been achieved. This also raises questions about the ownership of the environmental 
assets generated through environmental contracts. The public may feel that they have a 
proprietary interest in the environmental assets to the extent that they have been created 
through the contribution of public funds. Farmers may anticipate this problem and so be 
reluctant to enter into environmental contracts in the first place, the concern being that 
restrictive designations might subsequently be introduced to protect long-term environmental 
gains (Hodge 2001). 
 
The issue of uncertainty with respect to the future implies that not only foregone benefits at 
present are important, but also foregone benefits in the future may play a role in choosing 
current options. To illustrate this point, consider an n-period contract (for example, set land 
aside for n-period as in the example 2) in Section 4.5), which provides compensation (S) to the 
farmer equal to the forgone monetary income ( IΔ ), calculated on the basis of market prices 
(p) and other economic conditions (D). Assume the contract will be offered both in period 0 
and period 1, and that the associated compensations that will be paid are based on the 
foregone income calculated using the actual information as known at the beginning of the 
period in which the contract is offered. The contracting period starts when the contract is 
accepted. If the contract is accepted in period 0, it will be binding in period 1 and the 
subsequent years, until the time of n periods has elapsed. Therefore, the decision to accept 
the contract is irreversible within a period of n years. If the contract is not accepted in period 
0, it can be reconsidered in period 1 using information in period 1.  
 
To simplify the illustration, assume that the farmer only compares the compensation and 
foregone income to decide whether to accept the contract. This can be seen as a simplified 
version of the decision model described in Chapter 4 in which all other changes are exactly 
offset in terms of utility and only monetary income needs to be compared. 
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The situation described above is summarized in Table 9, where the symbol .)(tE denotes 
expectation made in period t, the symbol ~ indicates dependency among the variables, and r 
is the discount rate. Note that the situation involves multi-period decision making (period 0 and 
period 1) and irreversibility (once the contract is accepted, it cannot be revoked).  
 
Table 9: Multi-annual contract and expectation of future monetary income 
Period  t=0 t=1 t=i 
Item Notation   i = 2, …,n 
Monetary income 
tI  0I  1I  iI  
     
Foregone monetary 
income in each 
period t 
tIΔ  000 ,~ DpIΔ  111 ,~ DpIΔ  iI 2Δ  
     
NPV of expected  
total foregone 
income in each 
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)( IEt Δ  
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Given the assumptions made (no changes in utility due to changes in non-monetary factors) 
the farmers behavior is reduced to profit maximization. As already noted before, this comes 
down to comparing the income forgone when accepting the contract with the remuneration it 
will bring. Since this optimization problem is characterized by multiple periods, both have to 
be evaluated in net present value terms. This requires proper discounting (at a discount rate 
r). The farmer will accept a contract if in the period t when it is offered it holds that )(SEt  is 
greater than )( IEt Δ .  
 
Table 9 shows how expectations with respect to future monetary income flowing from the 
farmer’s main activity influence the farmer’s decision making through the comparison of 
)( IEt Δ and )(SEt . The compensation provided by the policy instrument, )(SEt , can be 
lower than the perceived opportunity costs in terms of expected foregone income, )( IEt Δ , 
i.e., 0
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, which will strictly hold if 
02010 )(),( IIEIE i Δ>ΔΔ .This can happen when farmer expects that monetary income will 
increase in the future without engaging in the policy scheme, for example, due to increasing 
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commodity prices. In other words, future developments that may influence the profitability 
(and nonpecuniary benefits) of farming increases the opportunity costs of farming in giving up 
their land or current practices.  
 
Empirical evidence indicated that farmers’ participation behavior may change over time (Hynes 
and Garvey 2009). One explanation could be that expectations with respect to the future may 
change over time. For example, if the contract is not accepted in period 0, Table 9 shows that 
in period 1, expectation on foregone income in the contracting period becomes )( 21 iIE Δ . 
This is likely to be different from the expectation in period 0 )( 20 iIE Δ . As a result, the cost-
benefit comparison may be different from period 0 even though the compensation amount tS  
is updated to 11 IS Δ= . On the other hand, if the compensation amount is not updated in 
period 1, i.e. 01 SS = , there will be incentive to postpone the decision if there is high 
uncertainty about iI2Δ and the uncertainty will be reduced in period 1. This means that the 
farmer’s participating decision may change over time due to changing expectations on future.  
 
In economic literature it is now well established that in multi-period decision-making, 
uncertainty about future benefits and high upfront sunk costs create incentive to wait (see, 
e.g., Dixit and Pindyck 1994). The opportunity to decide later creates option value which 
increases the current foregone benefits. Option values are important when decisions entail 
some irreversibility. For example, the participation in public provision may imply that in the 
future, when farming becomes more profitable, the farmer cannot freely or costlessly return 
to (traditional) farming again. A rational farmer can therefore anticipate future developments in 
agri-environmental policy and general social-economic contexts and keep options open by not 
participating the policy scheme in the first periods.  
 
Another issue related to multi-period instruments or schemes is the problem of ‘time 
inconsistency’. Time inconsistency refers in general to the situation in which some agent, 
planner, or objective maximizer must make a choice about an action or decision in some 
future plan and in which what is optimal initially is no longer optimal at a later date. This 
change in what is optimal occurs despite the fact that nothing new is learned and no physical 
circumstances change, except that decisions of the past are locked in place.  
 
Public goods are not inherent to certain goods but are determined by a certain incentive 
structure which reflect the society’s value. Both the incentive structure and the society’s value 
system can change in the future. A green or blue service may ceased to be a ‘public good’ 
due to changes in public values and entails changes in the policy and its instruments. Farmers 
may be afraid that the compensations that were expected from the policy may not be realized 
due to changing social or policy circumstances. These considerations can have a significant 
effect when the farm is risk averse.  
 
An important future research line is how to incorporate farmers’ expectations of future 
developments into policy design. Payment schemes might need to include some contingency 
claims which entitles the farmer to be compensated if, as a consequence of participating in 
the policy scheme, the farmer finds himself in a disadvantageous position. Retaining these 
claims in the future might induce participation in the policy scheme, however, it can increase 
the implementation costs of the policy. How to reach a social optimal needs further 
investigation. 
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Box Time inconsistency 
We can use a simple example to illustrate the time inconsistency issue. Consider a farmer who would like 
to receive payment for public goods provision. A pair of obvious questions are: (1) would the farmer like 
to receive the payment, and (2) would the farmer like to not produce the public goods (to save the 
costs). The answers are yes and yes. Unfortunately for the farmer, the second option is usually not open. 
A pair of less obvious questions are: (1) at the time of entering the public good provision scheme 
(signing the contract), would the farmer like there to be an enforcement agency that would ensure that 
he produces the public good, and (2) at the time of delivering the public good, would the farmer like 
there to be an enforcement agency that would ensure the public good is produced. The answer to the 
second question is likely to be no, for production of public goods (which incurs costs) is not desirable to 
the farmer. The answer to the first question, however, is likely to be yes. In order to grant the payment 
to the farmer, the government must have some reassurance that the public good will be produced, and 
the enforcement agency will provide that reassurance.  
 
The farmer might have a rank ordering over three possible outcomes: A – no payment, no public good 
provision, B – payment, public good provision, C - payment, no public provision. C is the most preferred, 
while B is next. The worst outcome is A. In the contracting period, the farmer prefers that enforcement 
be present because case B is preferred to case A. The time inconsistency is not that the farmer would 
prefer to not produce the public good. It is rather that in the first period (when the provision contract is 
written) the farmer prefers to have an enforcement agency in place while in the production period he 
prefers not to have one in place. 
 
 
5.4 Crowing-out of various policy instruments 
Public good policy may consist of a number of instruments that can provide different 
incentives and constraints to the farmer. There might exist competing, complementary or joint 
relationship among these policy instruments in terms of the targeted public goods output.  
In case of competition, a ‘crowding-out’ problem can arise when incentives provided by one 
policy instrument overrule those provided by other instruments and undermine its effect. This 
existence of ‘crowding-out’ problem requires better co-ordination of different policies. Co-
ordination is also of importance when synergetic effect is possible among different policy 
instruments. 
 
A specific example where crowding out may play a role is related to the competition of 
spending labor on-farm and off-farm employment. In the previous analysis (see chapter 4) it 
has already been shown that opportunity costs of providing public goods can be related to the 
off –farm labor remuneration (e.g. Table 7). However, there might be further issues influencing 
crowding out. For example, in order to realize the off-farm wage, it might be required to be 
available for the labor market for a minimum number of hours per week. If so this potentially 
will introduce further implications for the on-farm labor use, in particular when a farmer would 
like to combine on-farm and off-farm employment, or as he would like to keep the option to 
obtain off-farm employment open. Another issue is the difference in certainty. For example, an 
off-farm employment contract might be evaluated as a more certain source of income than on-
farm employment, or labor remuneration for the provision of public goods.  
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6 Policy implications and practical lessons 
This chapter summarizes the main lessons derived from this research, which will be presented 
in a non-technical language. The results of this study regard four themes: 
1) concepts and production technology issues; 
2) governance and optimality of policies, when looked at from a welfare maximization 
perspective; 
3) insight into farmers’ behavior, in particular in response to policies which would re-label the 
single farm payment to other payments aimed at stimulation the provision of green and 
blue services; 
4) intertemporal issues considering the choices farmers make, in particular when participation 
in certain programs might affect the long term development perspective of farms. Also 
some other miscellaneous issues like information asymmetry, policy design and type of 
farmers that will be attracted, crowding-out phenomena, etc. are addressed under this 
heading.  
 
The chapter closes with brief concluding paragraph, which highlights also some other 
contributions (e.g. significance of this project for the modeling of public good activities). 
 
 
6.1 Concepts and production technology issues 
• Green and blue services are typical examples of public goods, i.e. being non-rival and non-
excludable. This has implications for their allocation. Markets will fail to ensure an optimal 
allocation. The level of public good provision will be in general too low and might even be 
zero. 
• Green and blue services are often related to externalities (e.g. biodiversity, landscape) 
generated by agriculture. Many externalities partake of the character of public goods. The 
externalities might be depletable or non-depletable. In the first case the impacts of the 
externality have a slightly private character (e.g. trash dumping), whereas in the second 
case the impacts extend to the general public. 
• Externality-effects are a wide-spread phenomenon in economics. However, most 
externalities can be characterized as so-called pecuniary externalities. Their impacts affect 
markets and also the market allocation, but the market can well handle these. So from a 
welfare optimization point of view on pecuniairy externalities no intervening government 
policies are justified. 
• Agriculture produces both positive (e.g. nice landscape) and negative (e.g. Nitrate leaching 
to groundwater) externalities. When searching for the optimal policies both have to be taken 
into account simultaneously, implying a net public payment consisting of remunerative 
payments (for positive externalities) and punishing fines (for negative externalities). Note 
that in case an activity generates more negative than positive externalities the net payment 
may be negative (tax). 
• Private and public outputs of agriculture might be connected in various ways. They might 
be jointly produced, in which case it is impossible to relate the costs of production to one 
specific output (e.g. open landscape and permanent pasture). They might be 
complementary and show a positive correlation (e.g. milk and beef when dual purpose 
cattle breeds are used; application of cover crop in winter time aimed at enhancing soil 
productivity will also reduce sensitivity to erosion and surface water contamination). They 
might be competing, where the supply of one output goes at the cost of the other (e.g. 
buffer zones compete with cultivated area). These characterizations are not absolute but 
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might only hold within certain ranges, beyond which the character switches to an alternative 
possibility. 
• The interconnectedness of private and public goods have implications for the policy realm. 
If for example production has a joined character the optimal provision of the public good 
could be achieved by (private) output-related support. 
 
 
6.2 Governance and optimality of policies 
• In general positive and negative externalities lead to a suboptimal allocation because the 
market fails to take externalities properly into account. 
• The mere existence of externalities related to agriculture is not sufficient to justify 
government interference. In case the impacts of the externalities spread to large numbers 
of victims or beneficiaries, government interference might in principle be relevant. 
• The standard way to restore optimality in case of externalities is by introducing Pigovian 
taxes (negative externality) and subsidies (positive externality) and impose these with 
respect to the generator(s) of the externalities11. 
• Introducing price distortions (for example by creating import tariffs and export subsidies) is 
not an optimal solution in this case. This is because prices and price distortions treat 
supplies and demanders in a symmetric way, whereas in this case an asymmetric 
treatment is required for optimality. 
• Within the WTO’s trade negotiation framework, the issue of public goods should be 
recognized. This implies that member states should have freedom with respect to the 
Pigovian taxes and subsidies instrument. Note that the language might be a bit confusing 
here: a Pigovian subsidy, for example, is when properly targeted no subsidy in the strict 
sense of the word, but rather a compensation for services delivered (equivalent with normal 
prices). 
• From a social welfare maximizing point of view it is in general not optimal to subsidize 
victims (of negative externalities) or tax beneficiaries (of positive externalities). Incentive 
policies should only focus on the generators of the externalities. 
• As a consequence of the foregoing, using payment schemes, which let the beneficiaries of 
positive externalities (public goods) pay for their consumption or enjoyment of the benefits 
derived from the externality (for example to general money for compensating the farmers) 
is generally inefficient. It will reduce or inhibit the consumption of the public good to 
suboptimal levels (too few consumers might benefit from it). 
• The foregoing result does not imply that voluntary private donations, aimed to ensuring or 
encouraging public good provision by agriculture, that are made to farmers conditionally on 
them taking certain actions generating the externality might be suboptimal. If there is no 
government interference private payment schemes are most likely to be welfare improving 
relative to the free market equilibrium. However, they in general will be insufficient to 
achieve a full welfare optimum. As such private schemes are no alternative for government 
interference. 
 
 
6.3 Farmer’s behavior 
• When analyzing the farmers behavior with respect to the provision of public goods, it is 
recommendable to follow a utility maximization framework rather than a less-general profit 
maximization framework. The utility maximization framework allows better for the role of 
farmer attitudes and responsiveness to risk.  
                                                   
11  Agri-environmental schemes (for nature, wildlife and landscape preservation) can be interpreted as 
operationalizations of the Pigovian subsidy principle.  
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• In a situation without policy intervention for public goods, farmers can still voluntarily 
provide public goods. The main reason then probably is because the public good is jointly 
produced with the private good or there the private and public good are characterized by 
complementarity (e.g. milk production and pasture grazing with dairy cows). Another 
possibility is that the public good enters into the utility function of the farmer and thus 
generates non-pecuniary benefits to the farmer (e.g. the farmer’s appreciation of a nice 
homestead). A final possibility is that public goods not directly enter as an argument into 
the farmers utility function, but determine the shape of the utility function through ‘moral’ 
motives like altruism, responsibility for the countryside, stewardship, accepted good 
farming practice codes, etc. If so farmers can be said to be intrinsically motivated to 
supply public goods. This latter phenomenon might play a significant role (with maybe 
animal welfare in the dairy sector as an example). 
• In case land is a not a binding factor a farmer will use land up to the point where the 
marginal product of the land equals the fixed costs per hectare. For value marginal 
products lower than the fixed costs we will get land abandonment. 
• Scarcity of land occurs when the farmer would like to enroll more land for production than 
the land available, this can occur when for example the marginal productivity of land far 
exceeds the marginal costs (high profit margin). When land is scarce, at the extensive 
margin the opportunity cost of land is higher than its value marginal product. As a 
consequence compensation schemes based on the marginal productivity of land will not 
induce a farmer to refrain from commodity production. 
• Opportunity cost, a key concept in economics, is the value of the next-best choice available 
to a decision maker who has to choose between several mutually exclusive choices. It has 
been described as expressing "the basic relationship between scarcity and choice”. When 
making rational choices, it is important that the gains of the chosen alternative at least 
compensate the opportunity costs associated with the alternatives forgone. The 
opportunity costs of farmers depends on their marginal utility of income. This implies that 
for the same level of compensation farmers with already high incomes are more prone to 
accept the compensation than farmers with relatively low incomes. This holds even if the 
marginal productivity of land is the same for both farmers. 
• An area payment can be interpreted as being equivalent to a reduction in a farmer’s fixed 
costs (either per hectare or also at farm level). As such it creates an incentive to increase 
on-farm labor input. 
• In order to induce farmers to participate in the provision of public goods, it follows from the 
participation constraint that farmers should be compensated for their inputs simply their 
opportunity costs (which are as a rule farmer specific). 
• When a policy instrument aims at stimulating the provision of a public good, one should as 
a general rule identify to the changes the policy instrument would cause to commodity 
production and compensate them according to their opportunity costs (foregone net 
benefits principle). 
• Heterogeneity in unobserved factors such as attitude explains some seemingly irrational 
behavior of farmers. From the point of view of targeting, compensation schemes should 
allow for the possibility to take into account these factors. This is in particular relevant 
when AES contracts are only offered to famers in certain zones, the characterization of 
which might differ from the general average.  
• Empirical research is needed to obtain information on unobservable factors such as 
attitudes, which may be indirectly inferred from observed characteristics such as off-farm 
employment, family income and other factors. 
• Characteristics of the policy instruments can greatly influence farmer’s behavior. Empirical 
modeling should take into account these characteristics and put them into a coherent 
decision making framework. 
 
 
54 WOt-werkdocument 203 
6.4 Intertemporal and informational issues 
• Who will participate? With a flat rate or general fixed payments, it is found that such 
payments led to a concentration of contracts on unproductive lands run by farmers with the 
lowest land use intensities (i.e. attracts farmers with the lowest opportunity costs). 
• Who will participate? With uniform payment, not accounting for spatial heterogeneity, least 
‘polluting’ farms (i.e. farms with relatively low intensity of production) are mostly likely to 
participate in public goods production since their opportunity costs are lower. 
• Information asymmetry: Informational rents can be reduced by applying policies that: 1) 
gather more information on landowners in the form of costly-to-fake signals; 2) rely on 
screening contracts (self-selection mechanisms); or 3) harness competitive forces through 
procurement auctions. 
• Long-term contracts: Decisions to participate in green and blue services have implications 
for future opportunities for farming. Taking into account of foregone future opportunities 
implies that compensation based only on foregone profits calculated from current profits 
are likely to be insufficient to induce participation. 
• The participation in multiannual contracts involves expectations about future income derived 
from farming without participating in a contract (the opportunity costs of participation) and 
the expected remuneration implied in the contract. Increasing uncertainty can easily lead to 
a change in, or postponement of the participation decision.  
• When the compensation for participating in the contract is updated over time, farmers will 
show a tendency to postpone participation decisions. Updating here implies that either the 
compensation amount is changed, or the rule according to which the compensation 
amounts are determinate is changed over time, or when the policy maker deviates from its 
own pre-specified rule (time inconsistency). 
• Timing considerations: option values are important when voluntary participation decisions 
by farmers entail some irreversibility effects, such as for example restricting freely or 
costless return to other farming practices or farm strategies. 
• A counterpart of ‘irreversibility’-effects is that introducing flexibility in the obligations as 
specified in the contract can reduce its importance. For example, allowing for certain 
adjustments in the obligations farmers have to meet in case of for example extreme 
weather circumstances might reduce their estimate of income foregone, and by that lower 
the opportunity costs of participation into the contract. As it is known to be difficult to 
specify so-called complete contracts introducing such flexibility might be possible even 
without reducing the benefits (e.g. biodiversity benefits) the scheme aims for. 
• Uncertainty might be related to the (feared or contested) ownership of the environmental 
assets that are generated financed from public funds. Farmers may fear that in the future 
restrictive designations might be introduced in order to protect the long term environmental 
or public good gains. 
• Long-term contracts (e.g. multi-annual agri-environmental SAN schemes) are in general 
more complex than short term contracts and introduce additional elements in solving the 
decision problem. Among these are increasing uncertainty, and the role of risk perception 
and risk attitude. 
• Long-term contracts also introduce the issue of time inconsistency (the policy maker 
changes its plans or the contract specifications while time is elapsing), which might affect 
the farmer’s trust as well as current and future participation. In other words, longer term 
contracts have a higher policy risk than short-term contracts. 
• “Crowding-out” among policies: In economics, "crowding-out" refers in general to the 
reduction in private consumption or investment that occurs because of an increase in 
government spending. In the policy arena, “crowing-out” effect can occur among policies if 
new or expanded policy to realize new policy goals has the effect of prompting those who 
are already participating in other policies to switch to the new policy, leaving the goals for 
the incumbent (other) policies unfulfilled. Policies for public good provision might introduce 
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crowding-out phenomena (non-smooth substitution between inputs, outputs and inputs and 
outputs) that are often neglected in the standard economic framework. This provides an 
argument to carefully think about coordination among policies (e.g. environmental, 
biodiversity, animal welfare, food safety policies). Realizing that this kind of phenomena 
may play a role, might also provide further insight into uncertainty, short-term – long-term 
trade-offs, and most-relevant opportunity cost determination. 
 
 
6.5 Concluding remarks  
This main contribution of this study is that it tries to disentangle the participation decision for 
participation in multifunctional agricultural activities (e.g. biodiversity and landscape 
preservation schemes, etc.). Often these activities have an externality or public good 
character, which implies that the market will fail to ensure an efficient allocation. In order to 
achieve an adequate provision of these multifunctional outputs and/or ‘public goods’ an active 
involvement of the policy maker is required. This study started to look at the peculiarities of 
this public good-management task. Also the interaction of such a public good policy with a 
country’s other policies, notably its trade policy, was considered. It was argued that in general 
Pigovian taxes or subsidies would be the appropriate way to stimulate optimal public good 
provision (or reduction of public bad). It was concluded, that in general this provides no 
justification for (protective) trade policies. However, the public goods issue needs proper 
treatment in the WTO trade negotiation framework: countries should have autonomy in the way 
they use Pigovian taxes and subsidies, at least as far as these payments are properly targeted 
and the implied compensations (or punishments) are proportional with the efforts (or harm) 
made. 
 
Significant attention was paid to concepts and production technology. With respect to the 
latter in particular the degree of jointness appeared to be crucial. Private and public outputs 
can be complementary, independent, or competing. Moreover, the trade-off between private 
and public outputs is most likely to be non-constant, but changing with changing private output 
levels. This may even lead to complementarity-competing-switches. As a general point, the 
results emphasize the need to carefully analyze how the public outputs are produced and their 
way of interaction with the private output. There is also a link from this to the determination of 
a proper remuneration of public good provision activities.  
 
As regards the behavior of farmers, in contrast with many other studies, this study takes into 
account the role that farmers’ attitudes, intrinsic motivations and moral convictions might play. 
Therewith also the potential impact of these factors on the participation decision could be 
analyzed. From the solution of the farmer’s utility maximization problem, and some further 
comparative statics analysis, the role of these and other factors was clarified. Moreover, the 
specific issues involved in case of multi-annual contracts was separately discussed. There the 
crucial role of expectations, uncertainty and ‘irreversibility’ on the participation decision 
became clear. Also insight was gained in what factors might lead to postponement of 
participation decisions. This could have been further extended to lock in-effects and 
compliance issues. 
 
It should be noted that this study has an analytical focus. As such it does not yet provide 
insight into the empirical importance of the various issues, and an empirical follow-up is 
recommended to create a more complete picture. However, this study provides valuable input 
about how to properly model public good activities. This is in particular useful, since the 
models used for policy analysis in this realm are still in need of further improvement, in 
particular with respect to the public good outputs. As the analysis showed, not only the 
regular variables explaining economic supply activities (such as output and input prices) are 
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important, but also the contract specification is crucial, since it is this that determines the 
opportunity costs of participation. It was argued that this relationship is complex. However, 
given that the basic mechanism is understood, the framework provides in this study might 
also be a guide to more simplified (or reduced form) approaches. 
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Appendix 1  Examples of production relationships for selected 
non-commodity outputs 
Commodity production Non-commodity 
Effects 
Fixed inputs Variable 
inputs 
 
Farming 
technologies 
and practices 
Commodity 
outputs 
Commercia
l non-food 
activities 
Direct 
provision of 
public 
goods 
Landscape Farmland area; 
Land use 
pattern; 
Farm buildings 
and structures 
 
 Silos, glass-
houses, 
livestock 
housing, 
irrigation 
Crop 
composition 
(structure and 
colour of the 
landscape) 
Buildings 
and facilities 
for farm 
tourism 
Maintaining 
farm 
buildings, 
flower 
meadows 
 
Species and 
ecosystem 
diversity 
Land use 
patterns 
Use of agro-
chemicals 
Animal 
stockings 
density, soil 
cultivation and 
harvesting 
techniques 
Crop 
composition 
Leased 
access to 
specific eco-
systems  
Wetland and 
other habitat 
creation, 
wildlife feed 
and 
corridors 
 
Rural viability Demand for 
farm labor (in 
the short run) 
 
   Extra income 
on the farm 
 
Based on OECD (2001) P40.  
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